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Rethinking the New Public Health
Lindsay F. Wiley *
Abstract
This Article contributes to an emerging theoretical debate over
the legitimate scope of public health law by linking it to a
particular doctrinal debate in public nuisance law. State and
local governments have been largely stymied in their efforts to use
public nuisance litigation against harmful industries to vindicate
collectively-held, common law rights to non-interference with
public health and safety. The ways in which this litigation has
failed are instructive for a broader movement in public health that
is only just beginning to take shape. In response to evolving
scientific understanding about the determinants of health, public
health advocates are rapidly implementing new law and policy
tools to alter our environments and behaviors in ways that
improve health at the population level. Critics of this “new public
health” movement seek to safeguard individual liberty by
disconnecting the law and politics of public health from its
science. They argue that modern health threats such as heart
disease and diabetes are individual concerns not sufficiently
public in nature to trigger doctrines that privilege state
intervention over individual rights. Public health scholars
engaged in this theoretical debate have overlooked a related
doctrinal debate within public nuisance law in which courts have
struggled to define the scope of “public rights,” including the right
to non-interference with public health. In both debates, critics
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have rightly insisted that the public must be more than the mere
aggregation of private interests. But the narrower conceptions of
the public that critics have put forth fail to account for the full
scope of the state’s authority and responsibility for public health.
This Article stakes out a middle position by adopting the
classically liberal view of public health law critics—that state
interference with individual liberty requires robust justification—
while also defining the public broadly so as to justify considerable
state intervention under the banner of public health. Drawing on
analysis of public nuisance litigation as a public health tool, I
propose that epidemiological harms—which I define as those for
which causation can be established at the population level, but not
necessarily at the individual level—should be understood as
public bads. This conception of the public provides a more robust
justification for the new public health law movement that more
firmly grounds it in the science of social epidemiology.
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I. Introduction
Public health is rapidly becoming a more invasive part of our
everyday lives. Walk into a Starbucks in New York City and
you’ll now see calorie counts listed on the menu. 1 Buy a Coke in
Washington, D.C. and you’ll pay a sin tax on it. 2 A cupcake from
your local bakery might taste a little different now that trans fats
have been banned from the baker’s recipe. 3 A session in your local
tanning salon is now subject to a 10% federal excise tax. 4 Soon, if
you pick up a pack of cigarettes purchased in the United States,
you might be brought face-to-face with a large, graphic image of a
diseased lung, an autopsied corpse, or a mouth full of sores and
rotten teeth. 5 Public health is also becoming a more prominent
1. See generally Bryan Bollinger et al., Calorie Posting in Chain
Restaurants, STANFORD GRADUATE SCH. BUS. NEWS (Jan. 2010), http://
www.gsb.stanford.edu/NEWS/StarbucksCaloriePostingStudy.pdf (presenting a
study of data from Starbucks finding that calorie labeling on menus in
compliance with New York City law decreased average calories per purchase
and did not significantly harm revenues).
2. See Michael Nebauer, D.C. OKs Soda Tax, Rejects Income Tax Increase,
WASH. BUS. J. (May 26, 2010), http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/stories/
2010/05/24/daily33.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
3. See M.E. Malone, Cooking Up Ways to Lose Trans Fat: New Ban has
Bakers Adjusting their Recipes, BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 25, 2009), available at
http://www.boston.com/lifestyle/food/articles/2009/02/25/cooking_up_ways_to_los
e_trans_fat/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
4. See Internal Revenue Service, Excise Tax on Indoor Tanning Services
Frequently Asked Questions (June 6, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/
article/0,,id=224600,00.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. Catherine Pearson, New Cigarette Warnings Released, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 21, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/20/cigarettewarnings-labels-photos-fda_n_880885.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In November 2011, a federal district
court issued a preliminary injunction blocking implementation of the graphic
warning requirement. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, 11-CV-1482 (D.D.C. 2011), available at http://pubcit.typepad.
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litigation risk for businesses. Manufacturers and distributors of
harmful products like asbestos, tobacco, lead paint, and firearms
are facing not only private plaintiffs, but also federal, state, and
city attorneys. 6 In their parens patriae capacity, 7 governmental
plaintiffs have brought public nuisance suits against these
industries to vindicate collectively held, common law rights to
non-interference with public health and safety. 8
It used to be that problems like heart disease, diabetes, and
cancer were brought to our attention primarily through public
service announcements and warnings from our doctors urging us
to eat better, exercise, stop smoking, and slather on sunscreen.
These messages sought to bring home the dire consequences that
would result from our unhealthy choices. But the more subtle
message was that these problems were a matter of our choices, a
matter of private concern and personal responsibility. That
message is changing. As the government is taking on a greater
role in paying for costly medical treatment, the public’s interest
in preventing disease and injury is increasing. 9 At the same time,
public health research is revealing the important role played by
social, economic, and environmental factors in constraining
people’s behavior choices and determining health outcomes. 10
com/files/rjr-v-fda-op.pdf.
6. See infra Part III.B.
7. See Alexander Lemann, Sheep in Wolves’ Clothing: Removing Parens
Patriae Suits Under the Class Action Fairness Act, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 122
(2011)
The doctrine of parens patriae gives a state standing to sue on behalf
of its citizens. Although it derives from the “royal prerogative”
granted to the King of England to sue on behalf of “helpless” subjects
like children and the mentally incompetent, parens patriae has been
expanded in the twentieth century by a series of Supreme Court
decisions, and has been an increasingly popular vehicle for state
attorneys general to vindicate the rights of their constituents.
8. See infra Part III.A.
9. This connection is readily apparent in the provisions of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act that address public health. See Thaddeus
Mason Pope, The Slow Transition of U.S. Law Toward a Greater Emphasis on
Prevention, in PREVENTION VS. TREATMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL, EMPIRICAL AND
CULTURAL REFLECTIONS (Halley S. Faust & Paul T. Menzel eds., forthcoming
2011) (manuscript at 13–15), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1734405 (describing the main provisions of the PPACA
relevant to public health) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. See infra Part II.A.
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Influenced by the “new public health” movement, 11 public health
law scholars have begun to redefine their relevance to the science
and practice of public health—as well as to the broader law and
policy community—by seeking to use law as a tool to protect and
promote the public’s health. 12 The result is an emerging debate
over the legitimate scope of the government’s role in ensuring
access not just to health care, but to healthy lifestyles and living
conditions as well. Increasingly, health threats such as diabetes
and heart disease are not simply viewed as personal failures to be
addressed through clinical prevention and treatment. In the new
era, they are seen as public problems amenable to structural
solutions.
The law and policy strategies of new public health are
generating controversy on multiple levels. In the blogosphere,
media pundits are serving up scathing condemnations of what
they view as overreaching public health interventions. 13 In the
11. The “new public health” label has been used by public health scientists,
ethicists, and legal scholars. See, e.g., THEODORE H. TULCHINSKY & ELENA A.
VARAVIKOVA, THE NEW PUBLIC HEALTH (2d ed. 2009); Awofeso, infra note 26;
NEW ETHICS FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH (Dan E. Beauchamp & Bonnie Steinbock,
eds., 1999); Wendy E. Parmet & Richard Daynard, The New Public Health
Litigation, 21 ANN. REV. OF PUB. HEALTH 437 (2000); Richard A. Epstein, Let the
Shoemaker Stick to His Last: In Defense of the “Old” Public Health, 46 PERSP.
BIOLOGY & MED. S138 (2003) (critiquing “new public health”).
12. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY,
RESTRAINT 29 (2d ed. 2008) (offering “a taxonomy of legal tools available to
government and private citizens to advance the public’s health: taxation and
spending, alteration of the informational environment, alteration of the built
environment, alteration of the socioeconomic environment, direct regulation,
indirect regulation through the tort system, and deregulation”); Scott Burris,
From Health Care Law to the Social Determinants of Health: A Public Health
Law Research Perspective, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1651–52 (2011) (describing
the role of public health law research in “identifying and ameliorating social
causes of the country’s relatively poor level and distribution of health”).
13. See generally William Saletan, Then They Came for the Fresca: The
Growing Ambitions of the Food Police, SLATE (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.slate.
com/id/2229194/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Greg Beato, The Vanity Tax: The Trouble with the
Government’s New Tax on Indoor Tanning Services, REASON FOUND (June 17,
2010), http://reason.org/news/show/vanity-tax-tanning (last visited Jan. 28,
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Mario Rizzo, The
Attack on Dignity and Moral Autonomy: The Case of Cigarettes, THINKMARKETS
(June 26, 2011), http://thinkmarkets.wordpress.com/2011/06/26/the-attack-ondignity-and-moral-autonomy-the-case-of-cigarettes/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2012)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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academic literature, a handful of scholars have put forward a
critique of the rapidly expanding scope of public health as a field
of science, practice, and law. 14 And in the courts, litigants are
arguing about which health and safety concerns are legitimately
viewed as public in nature, such that doctrines privileging the
role of the state should be brought into play. 15
This Article contributes to an emerging theoretical debate
over the legitimate scope of public health law by linking it to a
particular doctrinal debate that has arisen in the context of
public nuisance litigation brought by state and local governments
against industries that allegedly interfere with the public’s
health. Both debates focus on the meaning of the “public” as a
justification for government intervention. In public health law,
the theoretical dispute is over what makes any particular health
threat sufficiently public in nature to come within the realm of
public health. Critics of the new public health movement have
argued that the politics and law of public health should be
disconnected from the science of new public health as a means of
safeguarding individual liberty. 16 In public nuisance law, the
doctrinal dispute is over the meaning of “public rights” (including
collectively held, common law rights to public health and public
safety), interference with which is a key element of the public
nuisance cause of action. In both disputes, the stakes are high. If
a concern is designated as a public health threat, legal doctrines
that privilege state intervention over private interests come into
play. If a state or city government bringing suit in parens patriae
successfully establishes interference with a public right, the door
is opened to flexible doctrines of causation and fault that make
liability more likely. In both debates, critics of a broad definition
of the public insist that it must be more than the mere
aggregation of private interests. In theorizing a narrower
conception of the public, some have attempted to define this
“something more” in terms of public and private physical spaces.
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See infra Part III.C.
16. A public nuisance is generally defined as a substantial and
unreasonable interference with a right held in common by the general public.
See infra Part III.A. But there is considerable disagreement over what kinds of
interests properly fall within the realm of public rights. See infra Part III.C.
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Others have defined it in economic terms by linking public health
and public rights to the securing of public goods.
This Article stakes out a middle position that adopts the
classically liberal view of public health law critics—that state
interference with individual liberty requires robust justification—
while also defining the public broadly so as to justify considerable
state intervention under the banner of public health. I agree with
the initial premise of the critics that the public must be defined in
terms of something more than the mere aggregation of private
interests. But as a defender for the new public health movement,
I argue that neither of the narrower conceptions offered by
critics—the public physical spaces approach, nor the public goods
approach—adequately accounts for the appropriate scope of the
state’s authority and responsibility for public health. Drawing on
my analysis of public nuisance litigation as a public health tool, I
propose an alternative approach to theorizing the particularly
public nature of public health threats. I suggest that the concept
of public bads has been underutilized in justifying state
intervention to promote public health. I also argue that the
economic understanding of public bads—as negative externalities
inflicted on the public without consent—might be supplemented
by an epidemiological understanding. Epidemiological harms—
which I define as those for which causation can be established at
the population level, but not necessarily at the individual level—
should be understood as public bads. This concept has the
potential to provide a more robust understanding of the public
that may be invoked in justification of public health
interventions. Rather than advocating for a division between the
science and politics of public health as a means of protecting
individual liberty, my proposal seeks to root the new public
health law movement even more firmly in the science of social
epidemiology as a means of incorporating the communitarian
vision of public health within a legal tradition that is still
fundamentally liberal.
In Part II, I describe the evolution of public health law in
response to changing models of public health science and practice.
I also describe the emerging liberal critique of the now dominant
ecological model of public health—which emphasizes the role of
social and environmental interventions to promote health—and
the resulting theoretical debate over the new public health law
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movement. In Part III, I shift my attention to the use of public
nuisance litigation as a tool of the new public health law
movement. I provide a brief discussion of the historical
development and doctrine of public nuisance law with emphasis
on its recent use against the asbestos, tobacco, lead paint, and
firearm industries. I then introduce the doctrinal debate over the
proper scope of the collectively held common law rights that are
vindicated through public nuisance suits. In Part IV, I link these
two debates, analyzing the narrow notion of the public put
forward by critics in both contexts. In Part V, I propose that
protection of the public from public bads—understood in
epidemiological, rather than merely economic, terms—should
supplement securing of “public goods” as a justification for public
health interventions and public nuisance liability.
II. Public Health Law
Public health focuses on health at a population, rather than
individual, level. Its core science is epidemiology, 17 and its core
mission is explicitly progressive. Rather than being concerned
with the treatment of medical conditions on a case-by-case basis,
public health examines trends in health, illness, and injury in an
effort to understand their causes and develop interventions to
address them. 18 In broad terms, public health has been described
as “what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions
17. Even the definition of epidemiology as a discipline has experienced
evolution. See LEON GORDIS, EPIDEMIOLOGY 3 (3d ed. 2004)
Epidemiology is the study of how disease is distributed in populations
and the factors that influence or determine this distribution. . . . A
broader definition . . . has been widely accepted. It defines
epidemiology as “the study of the distribution and determinants of
health-related states or events in specified populations and the
application of this study to control of health problems.” What is
noteworthy about this definition is that it includes both a description
of the content of the discipline and the purpose or application for
which epidemiologic investigations are carried out.
18. See Geoffrey Rose, Sick Individuals and Sick Populations, in PUBLIC
HEALTH ETHICS: THEORY, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 33 (Ronald Bayer et al. eds.,
2007) (distinguishing between the individual-centered etiology used in clinical
medicine–which “seeks the causes of cases”–and the population-focused etiology
used in public health–which “seeks the causes of incidence”).
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for people to be healthy.” 19 The notion of the “common good” is
fundamental to this enterprise:
The health of the public is [a] shared value. Not only
does each individual have an interest in staying healthy
but also all of us together share an interest in having a
healthy population. . . . [W]e may disagree about the best
ways to promote the public’s health and how to weigh
individual liberty against the welfare of the whole.
Nevertheless, reducing disease, saving lives, and
promoting good health are shared values, part of the
common good. 20
Despite wide acceptance of the value of public health,
interventions to protect it frequently generate political
controversy, particularly when they make use of state
authority. 21 Public health law lives in the thick of this
controversy: it defines the scope of the state’s authority and
obligation to protect and promote the public’s health.
A. The Evolution of Public Health Law
Public health law is experiencing a massive transformation. 22
For much of the twentieth century, it was defined primarily as
19. COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF MED.,
THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988) [hereinafter FUTURE OF PUBLIC
HEALTH].
20. Introduction: Ethical Theory and Public Health, in PUBLIC HEALTH
ETHICS: THEORY, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 20 (Ronald Bayer et al. eds., 2007); see
also GOSTIN, supra note 12, at 21 (“Social justice is viewed as so central to the
mission of public health that it has been described as the field’s core value.”).
21. See GOSTIN, supra note 12, at 39 (“[T]he dispute [over public health] is
highly political, with conservative scholars urging limited state action and
progressive scholars urging far-reaching politics.”).
22. See, e.g., id. at xxi–xxii (noting that “scholarly attention to the field of
public health law has surged”); WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC
HEALTH, AND THE LAW 272 (2009) (describing the “reemergence of public health
law”); Pope, supra note 9, at 34 (describing the “revitalization” of public health
law “after a nearly fifty-year slumber”); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Public
Health Law for a Brave New World, 9 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 181, 182
(2009) (describing the “burgeoning” of public health law); Benjamin Mason
Meier, James G. Hodge, Jr. & Kristie M. Gebbie, Transitions in State Public
Health Law: Comparative Analysis of State Public Health Law Reform
Following the Turning Point Model Statute, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 423, 424–29
(2009) (documenting the “modernization” of state public health law).
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the law of communicable disease control. 23 Compulsory
vaccination and treatment, isolation and quarantine, and
surveillance of health data were its main subjects. Critics have
argued that this “old” public health law of communicable disease
control represents the legitimate scope of the field. 24 They take
issue with public health law’s new focus on chronic disease as
well as acute communicable disease outbreaks. They are
particularly wary of the influence of social epidemiology—which
has exposed the crucial role of social, economic, and
environmental factors in determining health outcomes 25—on the
new public health law movement.
Critics have vastly oversimplified the contrast between the
“old” public health law and the “new.” The development of public
health law has always been influenced by expanding models of
public health science and practice. Scholars have identified four
basic eras in the history of public health, each with an
accompanying paradigm for understanding the determinants of
health: the miasma model, the agent model, the behavioral
model, and the ecological model. 26 Each model represents a
23. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Scott Burris & Zita Lazzarini, The Law
and the Public’s Health: A Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 62 (1999) (“[W]e focus on communicable disease law, both
because of what it has meant to public health and because of its likely
importance in the future.”).
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See generally LISA F. BERKMAN & ICHIRO KAWACHI, SOCIAL
EPIDEMIOLOGY (2000); JULIE G. CWIKEL, SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY: STRATEGIES FOR
PUBLIC HEALTH ACTIVISM (2006). For a critical discussion of the emergence of
social epidemiology as a distinct field, see generally Gerhard A. Zielhuis &
Lambertus A.L.M. Kiemeney, Social Epidemiology? No Way, 30 INT’L J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 43 (2001).
26. My admittedly oversimplified typology draws heavily from two sources.
In an influential 1996 article in the American Journal of Public Health, Mervyn
Susser and Ezra Susser described three eras in epidemiology, each with its own
dominant paradigm: “(1) the era of sanitary statistics with its paradigm
miasma; (2) the era of infectious disease epidemiology with its paradigm the
germ theory; and (3) the era of chronic disease epidemiology with its paradigm
the black box.” Mervyn Susser & Ezra Susser, Choosing a Future for
Epidemiology: I. Eras and Paradigms, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 668, 668–69
(1996). They also suggested that a new paradigm, which they did not label, was
on the horizon. Id.; see also Niyi Awofeso, What’s New About the “New Public
Health”, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 705 (2004) (presenting the history of public
health eras); P. Hanlon et al., Making the Case for a ‘Fifth Wave’ in Public
Health, 125 PUBLIC HEALTH 30 (2011); Elizabeth Fee, The Origins and
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particular approach to combating disease and promoting health.
The relevance of law and policy tools to the project of public
health has varied from model to model, as has the type of
controversy generated by their use.
In early nineteenth-century Western Europe and the United
States, Sanitarians subscribing to the “miasma” model studied
and sought to improve the physical environment in urban slums
as a means of fighting disease. 27 They attributed disease to
“poisoning by foul emanations from the soil, water, and
environing air.” 28 They “studied a wide range of industries and
occupations; detected many hazards from dusts, heavy metals,
and general working conditions; and conducted national surveys
of diet, parasite-infested meat, and food contamination.” 29 They
Development of Public Health in the United States, in 1 OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF
PUBLIC HEALTH: THE SCOPE OF PUBLIC HEALTH (Roger Detels et al., ed.) (3d ed.
1997), reprinted in LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A
READER 27 (1st ed. 2002). In their seminal article on the revival of public health
law, Lawrence Gostin, Scott Burris, and Zita Lazzarini pointed to three
conceptual models of public health: “microbial,” “behavioral,” and “ecological.”
Gostin et al., supra note 23, at 69–70. The typologies offered by Gostin, et al.
and Susser and Susser are admittedly oversimplified, as is my own. I have
followed Susser and Susser in attributing each model to a particular historical
era. The “evolution” story provides a useful way of understanding the
development of public health law, but it does belie considerable overlap among
the three models during any given time frame. See Roger Magnusson, Mapping
the Scope and Opportunities for Public Health Law in Liberal Democracies, 35
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 571, 574 (2007) (“The 20th century reflects a gradual
broadening of the determinants that are understood to contribute to states of
health and illness in the population, and a growing realization of their
complexity and inter-relationship. This historical shift has important
implications for public health law.”). I have re-labeled the “microbial” model
described by Gostin, et al. as the “agent” model to reflect its applicability to noninfectious diseases. For example, applied to the problem of heart disease, the
agent model might emphasize cholesterol as the agent and point toward the use
of cholesterol lowering drugs. Upon a close reading fifteen years after its
original publication, Susser and Susser’s “black box” paradigm—which “related
exposure to outcome” with less attention to pathogenesis—and their description
of a new era on the horizon each appear to combine aspects of the behavioral
model with an early version of the ecological model. See Susser & Susser, supra,
at 671 (describing the black box paradigm as being associated with a “web of
causation” and noting that “the failure to control the disease resides in our lack
of understanding of transmission and illness in the social context”).
27. See generally GEORGE ROSEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 1, 220–26
(expanded ed. 1993).
28. Susser & Susser, supra note 26, at 669.
29. Id.
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championed public expenditures on “[c]losed drainage and sewage
systems, supplemented by garbage collection, public baths, and
housing [as] remedies that would disperse miasma, reduce
mortality and morbidity (as indeed they did), and dispel the
poverty of the new urban poor (as indeed they did not).” 30 They
also advocated for comprehensive legislation to establish state
and local health authorities and to regulate commercial activities
harmful to the public’s health. 31 In the United States, The
Slaughterhouse Cases 32 arose out of this effort. The U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the efforts of the City of New Orleans to bring
slaughterhouse operations under control and, thus, protect
citizens from cholera outbreaks. 33 In doing so, the Court affirmed
the preeminence of the state’s police power 34 to protect “the
security of the social order, the life and health of the citizen, the
comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the
enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of
property.” 35
Around the turn of the twentieth century, scientists
conclusively determined that diseases were attributable to
specific causes rather than to general environmental miasmas. 36
The gradual identification of the bacteria, viruses, and toxins
responsible for illness made effective vaccination and medical
treatment possible. 37 It also resulted in a major shift toward the
“agent” model of public health. 38 Unlike the Sanitarians’
30.
31.

Id.
See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 168–269 (1996); ROSEN, supra note 27, at 168–
269.
32. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (consolidating three similar
cases).
33. The reading of the Fourteenth Amendment put forth in the
Slaughterhouse Cases has generated harsh criticism, but scholars have
rehabilitated the public health rationale behind the slaughterhouse regulation
in recent years. See generally RONALD M. LABBÉ & JONATHAN LURIE, THE
SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (2003).
34. Lawrence O. Gostin, Jacobson v. Massachusetts at 100 Years: Police
Power and Civil Liberties in Tension, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 576, 577 (2005).
35. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 62.
36. See TULCHINSKY & VARAVIKOVA, supra note 11, at 14.
37. See id.
38. See Susser & Susser, supra note 26, at 670 (describing germ theory as
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environmentally focused interventions, the interventions
associated with the agent model were applied to individuals. “The
appropriate responses were to limit transmission by vaccines, to
isolate those affected, and, ultimately, to cure with chemotherapy
and antibiotics.” 39 But vaccination and treatment can only
eradicate an infectious disease if a high percentage of the
population is immunized, which creates community, or “herd,”
immunity. 40 The risks of immunization, perhaps amplified by
mistrust, led some to resist. Legislators thus adopted compulsory
measures to ensure adequate uptake. This period yielded
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 41 in which the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld compulsory vaccination for smallpox. 42 Relying on the
“social compact [whereby] . . . the whole people covenants with
each citizen and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall
be governed by certain laws for ‘the common good,’” 43 the Court
made clear that public health measures occupied a special place
in American law. 44
In the second half of the twentieth century, as chronic, noninfectious diseases overtook communicable diseases as the
leading causes of death in wealthy countries, 45 the public health
focusing on “single agents relating one to one to specific diseases”).
39. Id.
40. See Nat’l Inst. of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, Community
Immunity (“Herd Immunity”) (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.niaid.nih.gov/
topics/pages/communityimmunity.aspx (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (“When a
critical portion of a community is immunized against a contagious disease, most
members of the community are protected against that disease because there is
little opportunity for an outbreak. Even those who are not eligible for certain
vaccines get some protection because the spread of contagious disease is
contained.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Of course, this
is also the reason that herd immunity presents a potential free rider problem
whereby a few who go unvaccinated by choice are able to benefit from the risks
borne by those who opt for vaccination. See Gil Siegal et al., Policy, Politics, and
Collective Action: An Account of Collective Actions in Public Health, 99 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1583, 1583 (2009).
41. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
42. Id. at 49.
43. Id. at 27.
44. See GOSTIN, supra note 12, at 123 (“The Jacobson Court’s use of social
compact theory to support this expansive understanding of police power was
unmistakable.”).
45. See, e.g., J.P. Machenbach, The Epidemiological Transition Theory, 48
J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 329, 329 (1994) (“It is the transition
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model shifted once again toward the “behavioral” model. 46
Initially at least, the medical etiology of these diseases was poorly
understood, making the agent model inapposite. 47 Eventually,
problems like ischemic heart disease, certain cancers, and typetwo diabetes were associated with behaviors like poor eating and
exercise habits, tobacco consumption, and excessive sun
exposure. 48 Later, HIV/AIDS was similarly associated with
unprotected sexual intercourse and intravenous drug use. 49
Based on these observations, the behavioral model of public
health advocated individual behavior change as a preventive
approach. 50 Informing people of the risks associated with
smoking, lack of exercise, or risky sexual behavior was seen
primarily as a task for physicians counseling individual

from a cause of death pattern dominated by infectious diseases with very high
mortality, especially at younger ages, to a pattern dominated by chronic
diseases and injuries with lower mortality, mostly peaking at older ages, that is
seen to be responsible for the tremendous increase in life expectancy.”); Susser
& Susser, supra note 26, at 670 (“Shortly after [World War II] ended, it was
clear that, in the developed world, rising chronic disease mortality had
overtaken mortality from infectious disease.”).
46. See Susser & Susser, supra note 26, at 670 (“With the emerging
predominance of chronic disease of unknown cause, under any credible causal
paradigm the social and physical environment had now to be reckoned with once
more.”).
47. See id. (“Epidemiologists were faced once more, as in the Sanitary Era,
with major mortal diseases of completely unknown origin.”).
48. See Ali H. Mokdad et al., Actual Causes of Death in the United States,
2000, 291 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1238, 1239–42 (2004) (contrasting clinical causes of
death with the “real” cause of disease, including tobacco, poor diet and physical
inactivity, etc.).
49. In response to the association of HIV/AIDS with particular behaviors
(some of which are criminalized), advocates have emphasized the role of civil
and political rights in promoting population health. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Mann
et al., Health and Human Rights, 1 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 6, 19–22 (1999). More
recently, public health law scholars have examined the role of law itself as a
social determinant of health. They have noted that the criminalization of drug
use, sex work, and certain sexual behaviors has created an environment that is
not conducive to an effective public health response to HIV/AIDS. See, e.g., Scott
Burris et al., Racial Disparities in Injection-Related HIV: A Case Study of Toxic
Law, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1263, 1267 (2010).
50. See Susser & Susser, supra note 26, at 670 (“Once the major infectious
agents seemed all to have been identified and communicable disease no longer
overwhelmed all other mortal disorders, the force of the germ theory paradigm
faded.”).
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patients. 51 It was a project to which the law (initially at least) had
little relevance. 52 At a time when behavioral interventions
dominated public health’s approach to so-called “lifestyle”
diseases, public health law became a considerably less important
part of the American legal landscape. 53 Its primary statutes were
left unrevised and largely unused for decades. 54
Stymied in their efforts to convince people to change their
behaviors, advocates and researchers began to investigate the
ways in which external factors constrained people’s behavior
choices and health outcomes. 55 In the late twentieth century,
their model of public health expanded yet again to encompass not
only the properties of the agent of disease or injury, and not only
51. See, e.g., U.S. PREVENTIVE SERV. TASK FORCE, GUIDE TO CLINICAL
PREVENTATIVE SERVICES: REPORT OF THE U.S. PREVENTATIVE SERV. TASK FORCE
LXXV (Carolyn DiGuiseppi et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996) (noting that prevention of
conditions created by unhealthy behavior choices “requires active participation
by the patient with guidance and support from the clinician”).
52. A notable exception during this era was found in the area of injury
prevention. See Susser & Susser, supra note 26, at 649. Seatbelt and helmet use
were mandated by law in a growing number of jurisdictions, despite arguments
that the behavior of going without these protections was primarily selfregarding and thus restriction of liberty was not warranted. Id. at 649–50;
Gostin et al., supra note 23, at 73. Challenges to seatbelt and helmet laws were
upheld, however, on paternalistic grounds as well as on the basis of the negative
externalities imposed by risk-takers on society. Id. at 64. Bans on smoking,
particularly in confined public spaces such as airplanes and restaurants, also
began to take hold. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health Against
Individual Liberty: The Ethics of Smoking Regulations, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 419,
441 (2000). These were justified (via the harm principle) by the nuisance and
health harms attributable to secondhand smoke. Id. at 442.
53. See Magnusson, supra note 26, at 574 (noting that “public health went
into decline in the post-war period; public health practitioners became rolebound as managers of state-provided clinical services, while research money
followed the biomedical model”).
54. See FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 19, at 10 (calling on states to
review their public health statutes and make revisions necessary to, inter alia,
“support a set of modern disease control measures that address contemporary
health problems such as AIDS, cancer, and heart disease”).
55. See Susser & Susser, supra note 26, at 670 (“With the emerging
predominance of chronic disease of unknown cause, under any credible causal
paradigm the social and physical environment had now to be reckoned with once
more.”); id. at 671 (“We know which social behaviors need to change, but we
know little about how to change them, even when entire societies are at stake.”);
Michael G. Marmot, Understanding Social Inequalities in Health, 46 PERSP.
BIOLOGY & MED. S9, S15–S16 (Supp. 2003) (comprehensively describing the
social determinants of health).
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the behaviors of the individual, but also the social, economic, and
physical environment in which the agent and individual
interact. 56 The development of the now-dominant “ecological”
model of health has been heavily influenced by social
epidemiology, which demonstrates that socially, culturally, and
materially disadvantaged people live shorter, less healthy lives. 57
This association persists across nearly every type and degree of
disadvantage that one can imagine. It seems to be firmly
entrenched even in places with universal health care, suggesting
that differential access to healthy living conditions and lifestyles
plays a greater role in determining health disparities than
differential access to medical care. 58
The ecological model places supposedly private, individual
choices into their social context and emphasizes structural
explanations for health behaviors and outcomes. In this view,
eating a diet high in calories and fat and low in nutrients is not
merely a matter of personal choice. It is a behavior that is
influenced by environmental factors: an information environment
that is loaded with commercial marketing 59 and a food
56. See TULCHINSKY & VARAVIKOVA, supra note 11, at xxiv (“The New Public
Health incorporates a wide range of interventions in the physical and social
environment, health behavior, and biomedical methods, along with health care
organization and financing.”); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., HEALTHY
PEOPLE 2010: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING HEALTH 18 (2d ed. 2000)
(“Individual biology and behaviors influence health through their interaction
with each other and with the individual’s social and physical environments. In
addition, policies and interventions can improve health by targeting factors
related to individuals and their environments, including access to quality health
care.”); Magnusson, supra note 26, at 572 (“The modern paradigm for
understanding the determinants of health and illness (both communicable and
non-communicable) calls attention to a cascading set of influences. These range
from ‘upstream’ social, economic, and environmental factors all the way down to
individual behaviors, clinical interventions, and genetics.”).
57. See Marmot, supra note 55, at S16 (noting that not just money, but also
culture and other factors lead to a “short life expectancy”).
58. See id. (noting that “we need to go beyond absolute measures of income
to understand the relationship between social position and health”); WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO), COMMISSION ON THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF
HEALTH, Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity Through Action on the
Social Determinants of Health (2008), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/
publications/2008/9789241563703_eng.pdf (explaining how daily living
conditions, including the effect of power, money, and resources affects health).
59. See, e.g., ELIZABETH S. MOORE, IT’S CHILD’S PLAY: ADVERGAMING AND THE
ONLINE MARKETING OF FOOD TO CHILDREN—REPORT (2006), available at
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environment saturated with unhealthy options that are cheaper
and more readily accessible than healthy choices. 60 Not getting
enough physical exercise is not simply a personal failure, it is a
behavior influenced by a built environment that discourages
walking for transportation and provides few opportunities for
active entertainment. 61 In turn, the information, food, and built
environments that one lives and works within are dependent
upon underlying social and economic factors. Poor neighborhoods
have more fast food establishments and fewer full-service grocery
stores than middle-income neighborhoods. 62 Children from lowhttp://www.kff.org/entmedia/upload/7536.pdf; CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB.
INTEREST, PESTERING PARENTS: HOW FOOD COMPANIES MARKET OBESITY TO
CHILDREN (2003), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/pages_from_
pestering_parents_final_pt_1.pdf (explaining that food companies advertise to
children through the television and through the internet); CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE
PUB. INTEREST, PESTERING PARENTS: HOW FOOD COMPANIES MARKET OBESITY TO
CHILDREN (2003), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/pages_from_
pestering_parents_final_pt_1.pdf (noting that it is difficult for parents to
compete with the advertisements on television, in magazines, at school, and
other sources that affect what their children want to eat); David Ashton, Food
Advertising and Childhood Obesity, 97 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 51, 51 (2004)
(“[A]dvertising to children does have an adverse effect on food preferences,
purchasing behaviour and consumption.”).
60. See, e.g., Paul Diller & Samantha Graff, Regulating Food Retail for
Obesity Prevention: How Far Can Cities Go?, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 89
(2011) (“Regulating retail food establishments can be a powerful tool for
improving a community’s food environment, especially in low-income ‘food
desserts’—areas that lack full-service supermarkets and restaurants and are
saturated with fast-food restaurants and liquor stores.”); Adam Drewnowski,
Obesity and the Food Environment: Dietary Energy Density and Diet Costs, 27
AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 154, 154 (2004) (explaining that foods that are higher
in calories and fat saturated foods tend to be cheaper).
61. See, e.g., Wendy C. Perdue, Obesity, Poverty, and the Built
Environment: Challenges and Opportunity, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
821, 825 (2008) (“Access to healthy food, sidewalks and land use patterns that
facilitate walking, and ample recreation facilities are all environmental
characteristics that impact obesity-causing behaviors.”); Montrece McNeil
Ransom et al., Pursuing Health Equity: Zoning Codes and Public Health, 39 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 94, 95 (2011) (“[C]ommunity design intricacies and urban
planning processes can lead to environments that either reduce or exacerbate
health inequities.”).
62. See, e.g., Neissa Smith, Eatin’ Good? Not in This Neighborhood: A Legal
Analysis of Disparities in Food Availability and Quality at Chain Supermarkets
in Poverty-Stricken Areas, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 197, 197 (2009) (“One reason
for this struggle is the tendency of chain supermarkets to provide a limited
selection of goods and a lower quality of goods to patrons in less affluent
neighborhoods.”).
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income families are more likely to live in communities where
public parks and playgrounds are in disrepair and where the
threat of violence keeps people indoors. 63 These are only a few of
the factors that determine supposedly personal choices, and
obesity is only one of the many health outcomes in which a social
gradient is in evidence. Public health science is demonstrating
that “[t]he poor sicken more than the rich not simply because
they encounter more microbes or engage in less healthy
behavior—their exposure and their behavior have social roots.” 64
The question is whether the politics of public health will keep up
with the science. 65
The ecological model of health has opened up expansive new
frontiers for public health law. 66 As public health scientists and
practitioners began to explore options for altering our
environments in ways that promote population health, they found
that they once again had a need for lawyers and policymakers.
Public health law began to evolve from the law of communicable
disease control towards a much broader discipline defined by
Gostin in 2000 as:
the study of the legal powers and duties of the state to
assure the conditions for people to be healthy (e.g., to
identify, prevent, and ameliorate risks to health in the
population) and the limitations on the power of the state
to constrain the autonomy, privacy, liberty, proprietary,
63. See, e.g., Gary Bennet et al., Safe to Walk?: Neighborhood Safety and
Physical Activity Among Public Housing Residents, 4 PLOS MED. 1599, 1605
(2007) (“Our data provide preliminary, albeit cross-sectional, evidence that
perceived neighborhood safety may serve as a barrier to physical activity in lowincome settings.”); Dustin Duncan et al., Association Between Neighborhood
Safety and Overweight Status Among Urban Adolescents, 9 BMC PUBLIC HEALTH
289, 290 (2009) (“Neighborhood safety may be an important contributor to
overweight, as it has been theorized that fear of violence and crime in the
immediate social environment is a barrier to physical activity and a facilitator of
sedentary behavior (two well-established predictors of overweight).”).
64. Gostin et al., supra note 23, at 75.
65. See Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health Law, 46
PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S199, S199 (2003) (exploring “the proper scope of public
health legal authority in response to compelling scientific evidence about the
social determinants of health”).
66. See Magnusson, supra note 26, at 574 (“The recognition that health
is . . . the product of the interaction of environmental, socioeconomic, behavioral,
and biological factors, partially modified by medical interventions--opens up a
variety of possibilities for public health policy.”).
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or other legally protected interests of individuals for the
protection or promotion of community health. 67
Gostin’s influential treatise refers to “law as a tool for the public’s
health” and identifies multiple models for legal intervention that
range far beyond the body of public health statutes and
regulatory codes. 68 Gostin’s text reflects developments in public
health practice. Public health advocates are working to develop
and implement innovative, evidence-based regulatory solutions to
a wide range of health problems. 69 They are also increasingly
involved in the development of groundbreaking litigation
strategies. 70
67. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 4 (1st ed. 2000).
68. GOSTIN, supra note 12, at 21.
69. See, e.g., Michael F. Jacobson & Kelly D. Brownell, Small Taxes on Soft
Drinks and Snack Foods to Promote Health, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 854, 854
(2000) (“To compensate for an unhealthy food environment, it has been
suggested that foods high in calories, fat, or sugar be subjected to special taxes
and that the cost of healthful foods, such as fruits and vegetables, be
subsidized.”); Kelly D. Brownell & T.R. Frieden, Ounces of Prevention—the
Public Policy Case for Taxes on Sugared Beverages, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1805,
1805 (2009).
A penny-per-ounce excise tax could reduce consumption of sugared
beverages by more than 10%. It is difficult to imagine producing
behavior change of this magnitude through education alone, even if
government devoted massive resources to the task. In contrast, a
sales tax on sugared drinks would generate considerable revenue, and
as with the tax on tobacco, it could become a key tool in efforts to
improve health.
T. Giang et al., Closing the Grocery Gap in Underserved Communities: The
Creation of the Pennsylvania Fresh Food Financing Initiative, 14 J. PUB. HEALTH
MGMT. & PRAC. 272, 275 (2008) (discussing “[t]he Fresh Food Financing
Initiative . . . [which] works to meet the financing needs of supermarket
operators that plan to operate in underserved communities where infrastructure
costs and credit needs cannot be filled solely by conventional financial
institutions”); Melissa Neiman, Motorcycle Helmet Laws: The Facts, What Can
be Done to Jump-start Helmet Use, and Ways to Cap Damages 11 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL’Y 215, 232–35, 238–40, 243–48 (2008) (encouraging courts and
legislatures to create a duty for motorcyclists to wear helmets); Eric P. Lynch,
Federal Gun Storage Legislation: Will this Keep Guns Out of the Hands of our
Children, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 211, 230–31 (1999) (analyzing The
Child Firearm Access Prevention Act, which “insure[s] the safe storage of
firearms in those states that have not passed such laws”); James Hodge, Jr. &
Gabriel Eber, Tobacco Control Legislation: Tools for Public Health Improvement,
32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 516, 520–22 (2004) (arguing for the implementation of
effective tobacco control policies).
70. See Peter Jacobson & Soheil Soliman, Litigation as Public Health
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B. The Emerging Critique of Public Health Law’s
Expanding Scope

Criticism of the new public health law was to some extent
inevitable. As Roger Magnusson has explained, “[t]he use of law
as a policy tool to respond comprehensively to environmental
exposures, unhealthy lifestyles, and accidental injuries threatens
to impinge on the interests of a wide variety of industries, and to
significantly expand sites for state intervention.” 71 As Lawrence
Gostin and Gregg Bloche have put it, “The ‘new’ public health has
raised political conservatives’ ire . . . by extending its reach
beyond the traditional domain of infectious disease to social and
economic influences on population-wide health. In doing so it has
inquired into . . . causal connections between ill-health and such
powerful institutions as tobacco companies, industrial polluters,
firearm manufacturers, and fast-food chains.” 72 Certainly, the
critical response to new public health is motivated in part by
material interests. 73 But it also arises out of deep-seated
philosophical and cultural views about whether the degree of
government intrusion supported by decisions like Jacobson v.
Massachusetts is justified when applied to noncommunicable
disease threats and the social determinants of health.
On a philosophical level, the debate over new public health
law arises out of a tension between public health’s
communitarian foundations and the liberal foundations of
American law and policy. Thaddeus Pope, a health law scholar
trained in philosophy, has articulated the tension in terms of core
values: “[l]iberalism demands that liberty limitation be carefully,
Policy: Theory or Reality?, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 224, 224 (2002) (“In recent
years, the most ardent proponents of litigation as public policy have been public
health advocates.”).
71. Magnusson, supra note 26, at 572.
72. Lawrence O. Gostin & M. Gregg Bloche, The Politics of Public Health: A
Response to Epstein, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S160, S172 (2003).
73. The industries mentioned by Gostin and Bloche have pumped
significant funds into mounting public relations campaigns opposing measures
such as taxes on sugared beverages. See Joey Peters, Soda Taxes Fizzle in Wake
of Industry Lobbying, MCCLATCHY TRIBUNE, July 13, 2010, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/13/AR20100713
03494.html (“In every state where a soda-tax plan has been proposed, it’s been
met with a heavily funded campaign from the beverage lobby to oppose any type
of increase.”).
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narrowly, and thoroughly justified. Communitarianism, in
contrast, holds that individual rights and social responsibilities
are equivalent, and that liberty and the common good have
equal standing.” 74 The dominant philosophy of American law is
liberalism—“a language centered on the values of freedom, selfdetermination, self-discipline, personal responsibility, and
limited government.” 75 Public health, on the other hand, “is
fundamentally an effort to promote . . . shared goals” of
“reducing disease, saving lives, and promoting good health,” and
is thus “a species of communitarianism.” 76 Broadly conceived,
public health offers a distinctly different “language” for talking
about “how a society balances considerations of personal
responsibility and social accountability in public policies that
impact health.” 77
On a cultural level, the expansion of public health law
highlights a central tension between the behavioral model,
which supported a cultural norm of personal responsibility for
health behaviors, and the ecological model, which problematizes
that vision and promotes public responsibility for healthy living
conditions. As Gostin, Burris, and Lazzarini have noted, “seeing
public health predominantly as the control of risky behavior can
quickly become, for cultural and political reasons, a warrant for
treating health entirely as a matter of personal responsibility.” 78
The behavioral model’s notion of health as a matter of personal
responsibility has been so influential that critics of the new
public health law have adopted it implicitly. Critics of the
“revolution” in public health have wrongly posited a shift from
74. Pope, supra note 9.
75. Id.; see also Scott Burris, The Invisibility of Public Health: PopulationLevel Measures in a Politics of Market Individualism, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1607, 1608 (1997) (“[T]o accept the rhetorical structure of market individualism
is to accept a political language that has no words for public health.”).
76. Introduction: Ethical Theory and Public Health, in FUTURE OF PUBLIC
HEALTH, supra note 19, at 20.
77. Lawrence Wallack & Regina Lawrence, Talking About Public Health:
Developing America’s “Second Language,” 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 567, 567
(2005).
78. Gostin et al., supra note 23, at 72 (emphasis added); see also PARMET,
supra note 22, at 111 (“If individuals are assumed to be the masters of their own
health, and if populations are viewed as mere aggregations of individuals, then
the health of populations can be seen as a function of individual choices.”).

228

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207 (2012)

the “old” agent model to the “new” ecological model. Ironically,
this oversimplified story 79 both omits and tacitly adopts the
behavioral model’s view that law has little relevance to modern
public health problems. It also ignores the extent to which the
ecological model represents a return to the basic approach of the
Sanitarians—who argued that health issues “were societal and
that the appropriate measures thus had to be applied across
society.” 80 Although the agent model drew resources and
attention away from the social reform movement of the
Sanitarians, 81 it was the behavioral model that solidified the
belief that “lifestyle” diseases were a matter of personal
responsibility beyond the reach of public health law. 82 The
ecological model vindicates this earlier cultural shift by
associating health outcomes with structural factors that
constrain individual choices.
Recently, a handful of legal scholars—including Richard
Epstein, 83 Mark Hall, 84 Mark Rothstein, 85 and Thaddeus
79. See William J. Novak, Private Wealth and Public Health: A Critique of
Richard Epstein’s Defense of the “Old” Public Health, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED.
S176 (2003) (offering an “alternative history of public health regulation in the
United States” that “emphasizes the close links between public health law and
the larger history of liberalism, state-building, and American constitutional
development”).
80. See Awofeso, supra note 26, at 705 (“[P]ublic health seems to have come
full circle.”). Compare Susser & Susser, supra note 26, at 669, with Michael
Marmot, Social Determinants of Health Inequalities, 365 THE LANCET 1099,
1103 (2005) (“[I]f the major determinants of health are social, so must be the
remedies.”).
81. See Susser & Susser, supra note 26, at 670 (“[T]he epidemiology of
populations and environmental exposures, and the social dynamics of disease
that had followed from the miasma theory went into decline, replaced by a focus
on control of infectious agents.”).
82. See Magnusson, supra note 26, at 577 (“Society looks to the state to act
decisively in response to risks posed by communicable diseases, contaminated
food, toxic spills, and other ‘externally caused threats.’ But debate persists
around the state’s responsibility to respond to risks over which individuals are
presumed to have control, including obesity, smoking, and chronic disease.”).
83. Epstein, supra note 11, at S138; Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the
“Old” Public Health, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1421 (2004) [hereinafter Epstein, In
Defense of the “Old” Public Health]; Richard A. Epstein, What (Not) to Do About
Obesity: A Moderate Aristotelian Answer, 93 GEO. L.J. 1361 (2005).
84. Hall, supra note 65, at S202.
85. Mark A. Rothstein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public Health, J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 144 (2002) [hereinafter Rothstein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public
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Pope 86—have articulated coherent and principled criticisms of
the expanding scope of public health. Although each scholar has
approached the issue from his own perspective, 87 I detect an
overarching project in their work as a whole. For the purposes of
Health]; Mark A. Rothstein, The Limits of Public Health: A Response, 2 PUB.
HEALTH ETHICS 84 (2009) [hereinafter Rothstein, The Limits of Public Health].
86. Pope, supra note 9.
87. The four critics of new public health law diverge in their reasons for
being skeptical of its expanding scope. Epstein generally argues against all
social and economic regulation unless it is rigorously justified in terms of
market failure. See, e.g., Richard Eptstein, Throttled by Compliance, DEFINING
IDEAS
(Mar.
2,
2011),
http://www.hoover.org/publications/definingideas/article/69086 (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (arguing that “feckless
regulations” will stymie innovation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). In contrast, Hall and Rothstein have each indicated that they generally
support the social agenda promoted by social epidemiology, but feel that this
agenda should not be co-opted by public health. See Hall, supra note 65, at S208
Beyond the public health arena, there are other good reasons for the
government to pursue the more general aims of education, taxation,
regulation, and redistribution, but these are broader social and
economic policies or they belong to legal realms other than health.
Public health advocates can be commended for calling our attention
to the health implications of social disparities, but health promotion
should not be the primary objective of corrective measures.
See also Rothstein, The Limits of Public Health, supra note 85, at 86
(“[C]oncerns about social justice should play a part in priority setting for public
health. My point is simply that resolution of underlying socioeconomic and
political problems is beyond the domain of public health.”). Their concerns are
civil libertarian in nature. See Hall, supra note 65, at S207 (noting that public
health interventions to improve basic sanitation, living, and working conditions,
including modern environmental and occupational health regulations are less
problematic because “these measures affect primarily only property or economic
interests, not personal liberty”); Rothstein, The Limits of Public Health, supra
note 85, at 85
One of the main reasons that I support a narrow definition of public
health is that public health laws give public health officials a range of
coercive powers to protect the population. Unless the scope of
permissible governmental action is carefully circumscribed, there is a
threat to civil liberties by governmental confiscation of property,
restraint on the movement of individuals, mandating of medical
examinations and similar measures.
Pope’s view is more accommodating. He generally agrees with the agenda of new
public health law, but feels that this agenda can be justified only in terms of
hard paternalism and that efforts to justify it on other grounds—for example in
terms of the aggregate costs that unhealthy lifestyles impose on society—are
dishonest. For this reason, Pope is perhaps less a subscriber to the liberal
critique than a describer of it.
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this Article, I will characterize this project as an emerging
liberal (in the classical sense) critique of the new public health.
The liberal critics have argued for a disconnect between
public health science and practice. Hall and Epstein begin from
the proposition that regardless of the validity of social
epidemiology as a scientific matter, it does not necessarily follow
that state authority to intervene “under the banner of public
health” should be expanded. 88 Epstein draws a distinction
between “the conception of public health that is internal to the
public health discipline, and the conception of public health as it
has been understood outside the public health field by historians
and lawyers who are interested in defining the appropriate use
and limitations of the state power of coercion.” 89 Similarly, Hall
stresses the need “to more clearly differentiate between public
health analysis and public health authority.” He seeks to divide
public health into two “broad responsibilities: (1) advancing
understanding and knowledge of the causes and patterns of
health conditions in society; and (2) eliminating threats to public
health. The first is the domain of public health as a scientific
discipline. The second is the domain of public health law.” 90 Hall’s
“central point” is that “public health law is much more limited
than public health science.” 91
These critics note with considerable wariness that in the
domain of law, designating a problem as “public” changes the
rules of the game. 92 Epstein has argued that by labeling health
behaviors like diet, exercise, smoking, and tanning as “public
health” problems, we trigger legal doctrines that privilege heavyhanded state intervention over protection of individual rights.
“[T]he case for government intervention . . . gets that extra boost
88. Epstein, supra note 11, at S154.
89. Id. at S138.
90. Hall, supra note 65, at S202.
91. Id.
92. See Magnusson, supra note 26, at 571 (“Debate about [the] goals and
definitions [of public health law] reflects competing claims about the boundaries
for the legitimate exercise of political and administrative power.”); Hall, supra
note 65, at S202 (“These definitional boundaries [between public health law and
public health science] matter a great deal because the law operates through
categories, and classification has huge effects on how legal issues are
analyzed.”).
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of legitimacy” when framed as a public health issue. 93 Rothstein
has offered perhaps the most eloquent statement of this position:
“The broad power of government to protect public health includes
the authority to supersede individual liberty and property
interests in the name of preserving the greater public good. It is
an awesome responsibility, and therefore it cannot and must not
be used indiscriminately.” 94 Ultimately, then, the debate over the
legitimate scope of public health law is a debate over the meaning
of the “public” as a justification for state intervention. Are noncommunicable disease threats and the social determinants of
health properly understood as public health problems?
III. Public Nuisance Law
This Article responds to the emerging liberal critique of new
public health law by linking it to a particular doctrinal debate
over the proper meaning of the “public” that has arisen in the
context of public nuisance litigation. Public nuisance law and
public health law share a common heritage in the police power of
the state. 95 At its core, public nuisance is a tool for addressing
93. Epstein, In Defense of the “Old” Public Health, supra note 83, at 1424.
94. Rothstein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public Health, supra note 85, at
148–49.
95. See Wendy E. Parmet, Legal Rights and Communicable Disease: AIDS,
the Police Power and Individual Liberty, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 741, 743
(1989).
In American jurisprudence the public’s interest in preserving health
was embodied in the concept of the ‘police power,’ a term that has lost
much of its early meaning. The concept of the police power appears to
have its roots in the law of nuisance and the common law principle
that property rights are limited to the extent that they injure others.
Thus the public, acting through the state, could regulate the rights of
real property or contract to protect the public health and safety. More
importantly, basic rights of property were limited by the needs of the
public.
Some have suggested that the public nuisance cause of action, at least when
brought by state and local government officials suing in parens patriae, is not
properly understood as a tort at all, but is more closely related to the state’s
exercise of its police power. See, e.g., Thomas Merrill, Is Public Nuisance a Tort?
4 J. TORT L. 1 (2011); Karol Boudreaux & Bruce Yandle, Public Bads and Public
Nuisance: Common Law Remedies for Environmental Decline, 14 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 55, 62 (2002) (“In public nuisance cases involving a private plaintiff,
the action is in tort. These cases are conceptually different from a public
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public bads. Its central element is an “unreasonable interference
with a right common to the general public,” including
“interference with the public health, the public safety, the public
peace, the public comfort or the public convenience.” 96 It is a very
old cause of action 97 that advocates have made new again by
applying it to some of the most complex public health and
environmental 98 problems of our time: the costs of tobacco use,
nuisance brought by the sovereign, which is more analogous to an exertion of
the police power of the state, as noted above, rather than tort.”). Like public
nuisance law, early manifestations of public health law were focused on the
state’s police power to limit property rights. See Robyn Martin, Domestic
Regulation of Public Health: England and Wales, in LAW AND THE PUBLIC
DIMENSION OF HEALTH 75, 79 (Robyn Martin & Linda Johnson eds., 2001)
(describing longstanding English public health legislation, which “does not have
as its primary focus the promotion of health, nor does it particularly address the
causes of ill health. The concern is with inadequate premises, on an
understanding that ill health results from identifiable bodies escaping from a
physical source”).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979). It is worth noting here
that public nuisance law does not create an affirmative right to public health
such as would create a governmental obligation of fulfillment. Rather, it
recognizes a negative right to be free from private interference with the public’s
health. This non-interference right is, however, intimately connected to the
governmental obligation to protect the public’s health.
97. The modern private nuisance cause of action originated as one of the
three ancient assizes in twelfth-century England—alongside trespass and
disseisin—which a private landowner could use to vindicate his property rights.
The modern public nuisance cause of action has a distinct, but equally venerable
pedigree. It also originated in twelfth-century England in the doctrine of
purprestures—whereby the Crown penalized public wrongs as criminal
infringements on the rights of the sovereign. Early nuisances generally involved
actions that obstructed public roads or watercourses, or made them hazardous.
See C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND
CONTRACT 3–5 (1949) (describing the process by which nuisance laws were
historically enforced); F.H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 L.Q. REV.
480, 481 (1949) (tracing the roots of nuisance in the common law). The early
criminal writ also allowed for “incidental civil relief.” William L. Prosser, Private
Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 997–98 (1966); Eric Kintner,
Note, Bad Apples and Smoking Barrels: Private Actions for Public Nuisance
Against the Gun Industry, 90 IOWA L.R. 1163, 1188–89 (2005) (citing Prosser,
noting that an officer of the Crown could initiate these early nuisance actions).
98. See generally JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES
FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT xix (Clifford Rechtschaffen & Denise
Antolini eds., 2007) (describing “how committed and creative lawyers in the first
decade of the new century have reengineered the old causes of action to make
them potent new tools for dealing with some of the gravest and most persistent
environmental problems we face”).
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gun violence, the contamination of our housing stock with lead
paint, and climate change. In a sense, the industry-wide public
nuisance litigation of the 1990s and 2000s can be viewed as an
early manifestation of the new public health law movement. 99
While Hall, Epstein, Pope, and Rothstein have focused on what
happens “When Epidemiologists Become Lawmakers,” 100 public
nuisance litigation to address product-caused harms might be
understood as what happens “When Epidemiologists Become
Litigators.” These new applications have regenerated an old
debate over the legitimate uses of public nuisance law. 101 Most
courts have been anxious to prevent these claims from going
forward and they have sought to do so by tethering the cause of
action using a wide range of procedural and substantive
doctrines. This Article focuses on the substantive dilemma at the
heart of these cases: can the harm to health and welfare caused
99. Cf. David Kairys, The Governmental Handgun Cases and the Elements
and Underlying Policies of Public Nuisance Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1178
(2000) [hereinafter Kairys, Underlying Policies] (“Public nuisance is the only
tort designed and equipped to protect the public from activities or conduct that
is incompatible with public health, safety, or peace.”); DONALD G. GIFFORD,
SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT INDUSTRIES: GOVERNMENT LITIGATION AS
PUBLIC HEALTH PRESCRIPTION (2010) (identifying public nuisance litigation
against product manufacturers as a form of public health litigation).
100. Hall, supra note 65, at S202.
101. Public nuisance has long been ridiculed by courts and commentators as
a “monster that would devour in one gulp the entire law of tort,” Tioga Public
Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 921 (8th Cir. 1993), “the dust bin of
the law,” Award v. McColgan, 98 N.W.2d 571, 573 (Mich. 1959); Osborne M.
Reynolds, Jr., Public Nuisance: A Crime in Tort Law, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 318
(1978), and a collection of the “rag ends of the law.” Newark, supra note 97, at
482. The same anxiety is palpable in court opinions adjudicating modern public
nuisance claims against product manufacturers and distributors. See, e.g.,
Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d
536 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[I]f public nuisance law were permitted to encompass
product liability, nuisance law ‘would become a monster that would devour in
one gulp the entire law of tort.’”); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 494 (N.J.
2007) (“[T]o permit these complaints to proceed . . . would stretch the concept of
public nuisance far beyond recognition and would create a new and entirely
unbounded tort antithetical to the meaning and inherent theoretical limitations
of the tort of public nuisance.”); People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,
Inc., 309 A.D.2d 91, 96 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (“[G]iving a green light to a
common-law public nuisance cause of action today will . . . likely open the
courthouse doors to a flood of limitless, similar theories of public
nuisance . . . against [these defendants and against] a wide and varied array of
other commercial and manufacturing enterprises and activities.”).
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by industries that manufacture and distribute dangerous
products be legitimately understood as interference with a public
right?
A. The Doctrine of Public Nuisance
Public nuisance is perhaps best explained by way of reference
to its cousin, private nuisance. For example, the owner of a hog
farm producing noxious odors and other unpleasantness gets
sued by neighboring property owners who argue that their right
to enjoy their own property is being infringed upon by the
defendant’s allegedly unreasonable use of its property. One kind
of public nuisance claim is a fairly modest extension of this
private nuisance doctrine. Imagine the hog farm is not just
affecting its neighbors, but an entire town. At a certain point, this
property-based private nuisance becomes a public one simply by
virtue of the large number of people affected. 102 But there is also
another kind of public nuisance claim 103 that does not necessarily
have anything to do with the defendant’s property use or the
plaintiffs’ property enjoyment. 104 It is this broader kind of claim
that has sparked most of the legal and political controversy over
nuisance. 105
102. See, e.g., Village of Pine City v. Munch, 44 N.W. 197, 197–98 (Minn.
1890) (“[A nuisance is public] if it affects the surrounding community generally
or the people of some local neighborhood.”).
103. Michael McBride, Critical Legal History and Private Actions Against
Public Nuisances, 1800–1865, 22 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 307, 313–14 (1989)
(describing two distinct types of public nuisance cases before nineteenth-century
courts—those involving the infringement of public rights and those involving
aggregations of injuries to private rights in land “so widespread as to be a
legitimate concern of the state”).
104. See City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1142
(Ohio 2002) (holding that nuisance claims are not limited to real property and
can be maintained for injuries caused by a product’s design, manufacturing,
marketing, or sale if the defendant’s conduct interfered with a common right of
the general public); 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 31, at 592 (2002) (“A public
nuisance, unlike a private nuisance, does not necessarily involve an interference
with the use and enjoyment of land, or an invasion of another’s interest in the
private use and enjoyment of land, but encompasses any unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public.”).
105. Of course, even the more limited doctrine of private nuisance has
generated its share of controversy. So much so that in the great majority of
states, our hog farm would be able to proceed with little concern for private or
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In general, a public nuisance of the broader type is defined as
a substantial and unreasonable interference with a right common
to the general public. 106 This right is sometimes referred to as a
right “of the community at large,” 107 or a “public right.” 108 Section
public nuisance liability of the first kind. In all fifty states, “right to farm”
statutes provide some degree of immunity from nuisance suits for farming
operations that meet certain criteria, even where their industrial methods
impose considerable burdens on the health and welfare of surrounding
communities. See generally Rusty Rumley, A Comparison of the General
Provisions Found in Right to Farm Statutes, 12 VT. J. ENVTL L. 327 (2011).
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
107. Prosser, supra note 97, at 999; see also Ozark Poultry Prods. Inc. v.
Garman, 472 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Ark. 1971); Fisher v. Zumwalt, 128 Cal. 493, 49596 (Cal. 1900) (noting that public nuisance is usually limited to “an invasion of a
right which is common to every person in the community”) (quoting Fisher v.
Zumwalt, 61 P. 82 (Cal. 1900)); see also People v. Rubenfeld, 172 N.E. 485, 486
(N.Y. 1930) (noting that to qualify as a public nuisance, “the number of persons
affected need not be . . . ‘very great.’ Enough that so many are touched by the
offense and in ways so indiscriminate and general that the multiplied
annoyance may not unreasonably be classified as a wrong to the community”).
108. See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 131–32 (Conn.
2001)
Nuisances are public where they violate public rights, and produce a
common injury, and where they constitute an obstruction to public
rights, that is, the rights enjoyed by citizens as part of the public. . . .
If the annoyance is one that is common to the public generally, then it
is a public nuisance. . . . The test is not the number of persons
annoyed, but the possibility of annoyance to the public by the
invasion of its rights.
City of Phoenix v. Johnson, 75 P.2d 30, 34 (Ariz. 1938)
A nuisance is common or public when it affects the rights which are
enjoyed by its citizens as a part of the public, while a private nuisance
is one which affects a single individual or a definite number of
persons in the enjoyment of some private right which is not common
to the public . . . The distinction does not arise from any necessary
difference in the nature or the character of the thing which creates a
nuisance, but is based on the difference between the rights affected
thereby.
City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 296, 343 (S.D.N.Y.
2007)
A public nuisance “consists of conduct or omissions which offend,
interfere with or cause damage to the public in the exercise of rights
common to all, in a manner such as to offend public morals, interfere
with the use by the public of a public place, or endanger or injure the
property, health, safety or comfort of a considerable number of
persons.”
(quoting Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968, 971 (N.Y.
1977)).
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821B of the Second Restatement of Torts “sweeps broadly in
defining a ‘public right,’ including “the public health, the public
safety, the public peace, the public comfort, or the public
convenience.” 109 In the United States, the non-property based
public nuisance claim has developed into a cause of action used
primarily by state and local governments 110 to address the
contributions of a private actor to unhealthy living conditions or
other unreasonable interference with collective interests. 111 In
the view of its proponents, “[a] public nuisance claim is the
vehicle provided by civil law for executive-branch officials to seek
immediate relief to stop and remedy conduct that is endangering
the public.” 112 In the view of its critics, it threatens to become “a
tort where liability is based upon unidentified ills allegedly
suffered by unidentified people caused by unidentified products in
unidentified locations.” 113
Public nuisance has been described by Victor Schwartz as a
“super tort.” 114 It triggers standards of fault and causation that

109. In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 848 (N.D.
Ill. 2002) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a)).
110. Private plaintiffs can also bring suit if they are able to satisfy the
“special injury” rule. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1) (1979)
(stating that to recover damages, a private plaintiff must have “suffered harm of
a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public exercising the
right common to the general public that was the subject of the interference”); see
also John G. Culhane & Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Defining A Proper Role for
Public Nuisance Law in Municipal Suits Against Gun Sellers: Beyond Rhetoric
and Expedience, 52 S.C. L. REV. 287, 291 (2001) (arguing that private actions for
public nuisance “serve no defensible purpose and should be abolished”).
111. See, e.g., City of Miami v. Coral Gables, 233 So.2d 7, 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1970) (public nuisance action brought by Coral Gables on behalf of its
citizens against air pollution from an incinerator owned and operated by
Miami); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824, 827 (Ill. 1981)
(chemical waste disposal site alleged to be a public nuisance threatening “the
health of the citizens of the village, the county, and the State”); Maryland v.
Galaxy Chem., 1 ENV’T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1660, 1661–64 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1970)
(public nuisance action brought by state on behalf of neighbors exposed to air
pollution from a nearby chemical plant, some of whom claimed to have been
injured by its emissions of toxic fumes).
112. Kairys, Underlying Policies, supra note 99, at 1176.
113. Richard Faulk & John Gray, Alchemy in the Courtroom? The
Transmutation of Public Nuisance Litigation, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 941, 981–
82 (2007).
114. Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance:
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are less rigorous than those applied to personal injury claims.
Public nuisance is generally understood as a form of strict (or “no
fault”) liability, 115 at least in the context of suits brought by
governmental plaintiffs. 116 In recent decades, however, some
courts have imposed an illegitimate fault requirement on public
nuisance claims more generally. 117 Although the causation
requirements are technically the same for nuisance as for any
other tort, the way in which a nuisance claim is framed alters the
analysis. At least in theory, public nuisance plaintiffs, who are
alleging harm to the public at large rather than to any particular
individual or class of individuals, 118 need only prove causation at
the population level. 119
Maintaining Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541,
552 (2006).
115. Id. In recent decades, however, some courts have imposed a fault
requirement on public nuisance claims. See Robert Abrams & Val Washington,
The Misunderstood Law of Public Nuisance: A Comparison with Private
Nuisance Twenty Years After Boomer, 54 ALB. L. REV. 359, 367–74 (1990)
(discussing the “improper imposition of traditional fault concepts on the law of
public nuisance”).
116. See Karol Boudreaux & Bruce Yandle, Public Bads and Public
Nuisance: Common Law Remedies for Environmental Decline, 14 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 55, 62–63 & 63 n.24 (2002) (arguing that “[i]n suits brought by the
sovereign, liability for public nuisance is strict, however in private action on
public nuisances cases the liability is based upon the defendant’s negligence”
but noting that “the liability issue in public nuisance is confused”).
117. See Abrams & Washington, supra note 115, at 367–74 (discussing the
“improper imposition of traditional fault concepts on the law of public
nuisance”).
118. Class action suits are like public nuisance suits in that they provide a
means for collectivizing private claims. See Developments, The Paths of Civil
Litigation, Part II: The Use of the Public Nuisance in Tort Against the Handgun
Industry, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1761 n.12 (2000) (describing generally the
similarity of class actions and public nuisance with regard to aggregation of
claims). But class action suits are based on the aggregation of individual claims,
unlike the claims at issue in public nuisance litigation, which are fundamentally
collective.
119. In recent cases, however, some courts have misunderstood this point
and imposed a requirement that governmental plaintiffs trace the harm from
particular defendants to particular individuals. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 134 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“[P]laintiff has failed to
allege causation in fact because plaintiff has not identified any specific
defendant as the source of any lead pigment or paint at any particular
location.”); Whitehouse v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, No. Civ. A 99-5226, 2003 WL
1880120 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 20, 2003); Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 793 N.E.2d
869, 878 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“[T]he plaintiffs’ failure to identify the defendants
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B. The Evolution of Industry-Wide Public Nuisance Litigation as
a Tool for Public Health
The great majority of public nuisance cases are of the
property-based type, which involve the defendant’s use of its
property in a way that interferes with the rights of others.
Beginning in the 1980s, however, advocates began to draw more
heavily on the doctrine of “public right” nuisance, in
circumstances where the harm to the public’s interest is not
mediated via property in the possession or control of the
defendant. Advocates first experimented with this approach in
the context of asbestos litigation. As asbestos building products
deteriorate, they release fibers that are carcinogenic when
inhaled. The dangers of asbestos became widely known in the
1980s and 1990s as a generation of (mostly) men, exposed to the
material through their work decades earlier, began to be
diagnosed with a rare and lethal cancer called mesothelioma. In
response, regulations were adopted requiring the removal or
other abatement of asbestos in school buildings. 120 Property
owners became concerned about potential tort liability for
allowing asbestos to deteriorate on their properties. At the same
time, individual victims of asbestos-related illnesses sued the
asbestos industry, though their claims were often stymied by
their inability to tie the injuries of individual plaintiffs to the
products of particular manufacturers. 121
Eventually, public nuisance claims were filed against
asbestos manufacturers by several municipalities and school
districts suing in their capacity as property owners to recover
abatement costs. These claims were not based on the argument
that asbestos-containing buildings constituted a property-based
nuisance. Rather, they claimed that the manufacture and
distribution of asbestos products constituted a nuisance. 122 These
who supplied the lead pigment used in the paint to which their children were
exposed constituted a failure to allege facts in support of the causation element
of the claim.”).
120. Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641–56
(2011).
121. See James L. Stengel, The Asbestos End-Game, 62 N.Y.U ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 223, 236 (2006) (explaining ways claimants may succeed in the absence of
manufactured products or premises identification testimony).
122. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 114, at 553 (citing Corp. of Mercer
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non-property-based claims were rejected by most courts. 123 In
Detroit Board of Education v. Celotex Corp., 124 for example, the
court concluded that products liability, not public nuisance, was
the proper avenue for bringing such a claim and that a product
could not constitute a nuisance. 125 Courts also relied on the
argument that nuisance liability requires that the defendant
have “control” of the nuisance. 126 They concluded that this
element could not be established in a case against a product
manufacturer because the product is in the control of another
party (in these cases, the plaintiff property owners themselves) at
the time that it causes harm. 127
“The watershed event” for industry-wide public nuisance
litigation came in the 1990s, when several state attorneys general
added public nuisance claims to their suits against tobacco
manufacturers, shortly before the Master Settlement Agreement
Univ. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., No. 85-126-3-MAC, 1986 WL 12447, at *6 (M.D. Ga.
Mar. 9, 1986)); see also City of Manchester v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp.
646, 656 (D.R.I. 1986); Town of Hooksett Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F.
Supp. 126, 133 (D.N.H. 1984); Cnty. of Johnson v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 580 F.
Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Tenn. 1984).
123. See Faulk & Gray, supra note 113, at 957–58 (citing City of San Diego
v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 30 Cal. App. 4th 575 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)); Tioga Pub. Sch.
Dist. No. 15 v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 920–21 (8th Cir. 1993); Cnty. of
Johnson, 580 F. Supp. at 294 (“[A]llowing . . . this action under a nuisance
theory would convert almost every products liability action into a nuisance
claim.”); Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513, 521 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992) (stating that “manufacturers, sellers, or installers of defective
products may not be held liable on a nuisance theory for injuries caused by [a
product] defect”); Corp. of Mercer Univ. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., No. 85-126-3-MAC,
1986 WL 12447, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 1986) (noting that even if asbestos were
considered a nuisance, “[t]he ‘nuisance’ creating property . . . was in possession
and control of the plaintiff from the time it purchased the asbestos-containing
products”); see also Nat’l Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. at 656; W.R. Grace & Co.,
617 F. Supp. at 133.
124. Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992).
125. See id. at 520 (noting that the case is clearly a products liability action
and may not be characterized as a nuisance).
126. See Peter Tips, Controlling the Lead Paint Debate: Why Control is Not
an Element of Public Nuisance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 605, 607 (2009) (noting that
courts sometimes impose a control element to public nuisance claims).
127. See, e.g., Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001); Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d
428 (R.I. 2008).
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(MSA) was reached. 128 Most of these suits did not produce a
court ruling prior to the MSA, but one federal district court did
rule on a public nuisance claim in Texas v. American Tobacco
Co. 129 The plaintiffs framed the claim in terms of intentional
interference with “the public’s right to be free from
unwarranted injury, disease, and sickness” and alleged that
the defendants had “caused damage to the public health, the
public safety, and the general welfare of the citizens.” 130 The
federal district court dismissed the claim on the grounds that it
was unsupported by Texas case law. Overall, however, the
MSA was hailed as an enormous achievement by the state
attorneys general. 131 Many have pointed to this practical
success as generating a groundswell of interest in public
nuisance litigation, even though it had not produced any court
opinions supporting its use. 132
Litigation against firearms manufacturers and distributors
provided the first opportunity for significant numbers of courts
to adjudicate public nuisance claims based on products
inherently harmful to the public’s health and safety. Products
liability had long been an avenue (though often a difficult one)
128. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 114, at 554. Others dispute the
importance of public nuisance claims in turning the tide of tobacco litigation.
See, e.g., Faulk & Gray, supra note 113, at 958 (noting that “many . . . wrongly
credit the use of public nuisance claims with turning the tide against the
tobacco industry” and arguing that “[t]he real turning point [was] the disclosure
that tobacco companies concealed documents showing the addictive nature of
smoking, and the nationwide coordinated effort of state-sponsored lawsuits”). In
any case, David Kairys has said that he saw the state tobacco litigation as a
model for addressing the role of manufacturers and distributors to contributing
to the problem of rampant gun violence. See David Kairys, The Origin and
Development of the Governmental Handgun Cases, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1163, 1172
(2000) [hereinafter Kairys, Origin and Development].
129. Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. Tex. 1997)
(discussed in Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 114, at 554).
130. Id. at 972.
131. Press Release, Dep’t of Law, State of Georgia, Statement of Attorney
General Thurbert Baker Regarding Georgia’s Tobacco Litigation (Nov. 20, 1998),
available
at
http://law.ga.gov/00/press/detail/0,2668,87670814_89151348_
89525625,00.html (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
132. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 114, at 554–55 (“Given the sheer
size of the award and resulting attorneys’ fees, it is not surprising that, since
the MSA, government and plaintiffs’ lawyers have attempted to apply public
nuisance theory against many other industries of product manufacturers.”).
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for plaintiffs suing the firearms industry based on the harms
associated with gun violence, 133 but this litigation was different.
The public nuisance claims against gun manufacturers were not
based on allegations that guns were defective products, nor were
the plaintiffs alleging that the manufacture of guns by itself
constituted a nuisance.
Instead, the plaintiffs argued that specific distribution
practices contributed to a public nuisance by facilitating an illegal
market for guns. Manufacturers and wholesale distributors were
alleged to contribute to the nuisance through two principal means:
First, by continuing to sell to a small number of distributors that
were known to be responsible for a vastly disproportionate share of
guns used in crime. Second, by knowingly distributing more guns
to areas with loose gun laws that were geographically close to
areas with strict gun laws.134 Although the majority of these suits
were unsuccessful,135 a few courts allowed them to proceed to
trial. 136 Those that did typically followed the plaintiffs’ lead in
133. See Thomas F. Segalla, Governmental and Individual Claims in
Gun Litigation and Coverage: Where to Go from Here?, in I NSURANCE
C OVERAGE IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 363 (ALI-ABA Course of Study 2000).
134. Kairys, Origin and Development, supra note 128, at 1171–72; see
also City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222,
1235 (Ind. 2003) (“The City has alleged that (1) dealers engage in illegal
sales, and (2) the distributors and manufacturers know of their practice
and have it within their power to curtail them but do not do so for profit
reasons.”). Plaintiffs in these cases submitted evidence that the “movement
of guns from the industry’s lawful distribution channels into the illegal
market” was discussed in industry meetings and that the industry has
“long known that greater industry action to prevent illegal transactions is
possible and would curb the supply of firearms to the illegal market.”
Kintner, supra note 97, at 1187 (quoting Robert Ricker).
135. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d
415, 421 (3d Cir. 2002) (dismissing public nuisance claims under
Pennsylvania law); Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 540 (3d Cir. 2001) (dismissing public nuisance
claims under New Jersey law); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d
98, 133 (Conn. 2001) (dismissing public nuisance claims); Penelas v. Arms
Tech., Inc., 778 So.2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (dismissing
public nuisance claims); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp, 821 N.E.2d
1099, 1111 (Ill. 2004) (dismissing public nuisance claims); People ex rel.
Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192 (App. Div. 2003)
(dismissing public nuisance claims).
136. See City of Gary ex rel. King, 801 N.E.2d at 1232 (holding that
plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to allege an unreasonable chain of
distribution of handguns sufficient to give rise to a public nuisance
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focusing on the characterization of the defendants’ particular
marketing and distribution practices, and not the products
themselves, as contributing to a nuisance. For example, the
Ninth Circuit held that a nuisance claim brought by a group of
private plaintiffs was “not about the manufacture or
distribution of a defective or properly functioning product . . .
but rather allege[d] affirmative conduct on the part of
manufacturers and distributors that fosters” a nuisance. 137
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Ohio emphasized the
argument that the defendants “control the creation and supply
of [the] illegal, secondary market for firearms, not the actual
use of the firearms that cause injury.” 138 However, this
approach was far from universally successful. Ultimately, the
litigation was effectively cut off by Congress via the Protection
of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act. 139 The Act precluded tort
liability for firearms manufacturers, distributors, and dealers
based on criminals’ unlawful use of guns. It also called for the
immediate dismissal of pending suits. 140
A couple of years into the firearms litigation, advocates
sought to use a similar strategy against the lead paint and
pigment industry in several states. 141 When lead paint
deteriorates, it produces dust and flakes that can easily be
ingested by small children. Ingestion of lead, even in small
quantities, during the early years of life when children’s brains
are developing rapidly has been associated with “measurable
changes in children’s mental development and behavior”
generated by defendants); City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No.
1999-02590, 2000 Mass. Super. Ct. LEXIS 352, at *63–64 (July 13, 2000)
(“To be sure, the legal theory is unique in the Commonwealth but . . . that
is not reason to dismiss at this stage of the proceedings.”); City of
Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1136 (Ohio 2002)
(allowing a public nuisance claim to proceed).
137. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1211 (9th Cir. 2003).
138. Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d at 1143.
139. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119
Stat. 2095 (2005).
140. Id.
141. Faulk & Gray, supra note 113, at 1009–14 (describing suits in
Wisconsin, California, Rhode Island, and New Jersey); Schwartz & Goldberg,
supra note 114, at 559 (describing the partnership between the Rhode Island
Attorney General’s office and private, contingency-fee counsel).
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including “hyperactivity; deficits in fine motor function, handeye coordination, and reaction time; and lowered performance
on intelligence tests.” 142 Although the link between lead paint
and childhood lead poisoning was established more than a
century ago, 143 it wasn’t until 1978 that lead paint was banned in
the United States 144 and much of the housing stock in the United
States pre-dates the ban. 145 Although average blood lead levels
(BLLs) among Americans declined rapidly in the years
immediately following bans on lead in gasoline and paint,
approximately 2.2% of children between the ages of one and five
still have BLLs associated with significant health impacts. 146
Advocates had attempted to use a variety of legal strategies
to require—and in some cases subsidize—the abatement of lead
paint in housing. 147 They also filed lawsuits on behalf of
individual children with elevated BLLs, but these proved even
more difficult than asbestos suits. Because there is no “signature”
injury that is linked to lead exposure in the way that
mesothelioma is linked to asbestos, establishing causation was
particularly difficult. 148 Reduced intellectual capacity and
142. National Institutes of Health, National Institutes of Environmental
Health Sciences, Lead (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/
topics/agents/lead/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
143. Child lead poisoning was first diagnosed in 1897 and was linked to
lead-based paints in 1904. GOLDFRANK, GOLDFRANK’S TOXICOLOGIC EMERGENCIES
1310 (8th ed. McGraw-Hill Professional 2006). A handful of European countries
banned the use of interior white-lead paint in 1909. The League of Nations
adopted a similar ban in 1922. GILBERT, SG & WEISS, B, A Rationale for
Lowering the Blood Lead Action Level from 10 to 2 microg/dL,
27 NEUROTOXICOLOGY 693, 695 (2006).
144. Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4831 (2006).
145. Joseph Pargola, Childhood Lead Poisoning—Combating a Timeless
Silent Killer, 37 RUTGERS L. REC. 300, 301.
146. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PREVENTING LEAD
POISONING IN CHILDREN 2–3 (2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/
lead/publications/prevlead poisoning.pdf.
147. See generally California Department of Community Services and
Development, Lead-Based Paint Hazard Control Program, http://www.csd.ca.
gov/Programs/Lead-Based%20Paint%20Hazard%20Control%20Program.aspx
(last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
148. See Kenneth Lepage, Lead-Based Paint Litigation and the Problem of
Causation: Toward a Unified Theory of Market Share Liability, 37 B.C. L. REV.
155, 158 (1995) (“Due to the generic nature of the effects of lead poisoning, it can
be difficult to show both that lead poisoning is the cause of specific health
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behavioral problems can be caused by a wide range of factors,
many of which are frequently present simultaneously for any
particular child who has an elevated BLL. 149 Epidemiological
data strongly supports the association between exposure to lead
paint and increased prevalence of low IQ and behavioral
problems at the population level. But it can be extremely difficult
to establish causation with respect to any particular individual.
Public nuisance litigation offered a potential alternative to
suits based on individual harms, but its success has been limited.
The public nuisance claims were based on the theory that the
presence of lead pigment in homes and other buildings
constitutes an unreasonable interference with public health and
safety and that the defendant manufacturers and distributors
contributed to this nuisance. The Rhode Island Attorney General
achieved a highly publicized victory in the form of a jury verdict
that was upheld by the state trial court. 150 But the verdict was
later overturned by the Rhode Island Supreme Court and courts
in other jurisdictions rejected similar claims. 151 The lead paint
plaintiffs had a more difficult time than the firearms plaintiffs in
framing the nuisance at issue as associated with the defendants’
affirmative conduct rather than the product itself. For example,
the New Jersey Supreme Court characterized the defendants’
conduct as “merely offering an everyday household product for
sale.” 152 This framing of the nuisance at issue as the product
itself left the claims susceptible to dismissal on the grounds that
the defendants lacked control over the nuisance at the time that

defects and that a specific case of lead poisoning is due to lead paint.” (footnote
omitted)); Brenner v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848, 853 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999) (stating that “there is no signature injury associated with lead
poisoning”).
149. See Richard L. Canfield et al., Intellectual Impairment in Children with
Blood Lead Concentrations Below 10 g per Deciliter, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1517,
1519 (2003) (listing covariables used which were based on established predictors
of children’s intellectual outcomes).
150. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, No. PC 99-5226, 2007 WL 711824
(R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007).
151. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008); see also
Faulk & Gray, supra note 113, at 978–79, 1007–14 (describing the failure of
suits in Wisconsin and New Jersey).
152. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 501 (N.J. 2007).
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it caused harm. 153 To the extent that the nuisance is understood
to be the product itself, manufacturers cannot be said to control it
after it is sold to consumers. Nonetheless, despite an overall
trend toward rejection of industry-wide public nuisance liability,
as recently as June 2011, several California municipalities
reached an $8.7 million settlement in a suit against the lead
paint industry. 154
Industry-wide public nuisance claims also received a
temporary boost from the decision of the Second Circuit to allow a
public nuisance suit to proceed against the coal-fired power plant
industry based on the harms associated with climate change. 155
The decision was ultimately overturned, however, by the
Supreme Court in June 2011 in American Electric Power Co., Inc.
v. Connecticut. 156 Climate change public nuisance litigation has
been split between more typical environmental nuisance
153. Id. at 499; Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 455 (overturning jury verdict
and trial court order because plaintiffs had failed to establish that the
manufacturers interfered with a public right or that they were in control of the
lead pigment at the time that it caused harm to Rhode Island children). Courts
dismissing firearms public nuisance claims relied on similar arguments. See,
e.g., Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1061–62 (N.Y.
2001) (finding no duty because gun manufacturers did not control criminals
with guns, and injuries were too remote); Camden Cnty. Bd. v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 541 (finding the causal chain between manufacture of
handguns and municipal crime-fighting costs too attenuated to attribute
sufficient control to manufacturers to make out a public nuisance claim); City of
Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that
even though illegal use of firearms may constitute a public nuisance, defendant
was not liable because the firearms were no longer under its control).
154. Millennium Holdings Settles Lead Paint Cases for $8.7 Million,
LITIGATION BLOG, http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/litigationresourcecenter
/blogs/litigationblog/archive/2011/06/24/millennium-holdings-to-pay-8-7-million-tosettle-lead-paint-claims.aspx (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with Washington
and Lee Law Review). This victory does not necessarily indicate the long-term
viability of industry-wide public nuisance claims, given that California courts
have given a particularly expansive interpretation to public nuisance doctrine.
See Matthew R. Watson, Comment, Venturing into the “Impenetrable Jungle”:
How California’s Expansive Public Nuisance Doctrine May Result in an
Unprecedented Judgment Against the Lead Paint Industry in the Case of County
of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
612, 614 (2010).
155. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 367 (2d Cir. 2009)
(alleging that emissions from smokestacks of coal-fired power plants contributed
to the public nuisance of climate change).
156. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
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litigation based on emissions from the defendants’ property and
innovative industry-wide nuisance litigation based on greenhouse
gas emissions from defendants’ products. The suit that was
eventually rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court after being
allowed to proceed by the Second Circuit was a more traditional
property-based environmental nuisance case. 157 The defendants
were operators of coal-fired power plants that emit greenhouse
gases from their properties. A suit that was withdrawn by the
plaintiffs in 2009 after an adverse federal district court ruling
was more akin to the suits against the lead paint and firearms
industries. The defendants in California v. General Motors
Corp. 158 were automobile manufacturers and the public nuisance
claim was based on the contribution of the defendants’ products
to climate change via their emissions after they were sold and
used by consumers. 159
C. The Scope of Public Rights in Public Nuisance Law
The uniquely public nature of public nuisance is in danger of
being lost amid the current backlash against the cause of action.
A handful of tort law scholars—including Donald Gifford, 160
Victor Schwartz, and Phil Goldberg 161—have articulated a
scathing (and influential) critique of what they view as a
proposed expansion of public nuisance liability. They have argued
that public nuisance claims against products manufacturers
should be dismissed because they can only be brought under
products liability law. Several courts have reached the same

157. Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 367 (alleging that emissions from smokestacks
of coal-fired power plants contributed to the public nuisance of climate change).
158. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
159. Id. (alleging that emissions from the defendants products—
automobiles—contributed to the public nuisance of climate change).
160. See generally Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products
Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741 (2003) [hereinafter Gifford, Public
Nuisance]; GIFFORD, supra note 99; Donald G. Gifford, Climate Change and the
Public Law Model of Torts: Reinvigorating Judicial Restraint Doctrines, 62 S.C.
L. REV. 201 (2011) [hereinafter Gifford, Climate Change].
161. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 114, at 552.
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conclusion, 162 effectively rejecting the non-property based, “public
rights” version of the public nuisance tort. Public nuisance
advocates have disagreed sharply with this view, arguing that
products liability is simply not the proper framework for
understanding the harm that these suits have attempted to
address. 163 They have viewed public nuisance claims as a means
of addressing the underlying causes of social ills, not as a means
of marginally increasing the safety of particular products. 164
Courts sense (rightly, I think) that they must be cautious
about when plaintiffs are allowed to take advantage of the
flexible fault and causation doctrines associated with public
nuisance. 165 They have been anxious to dismiss industry-wide
public nuisance claims, but their opinions taken as a whole fail to
articulate a consistent, principled basis for doing so. In many
cases, courts have applied more stringent doctrines of fault and
causation from personal injury law to public nuisance claims, 166
effectively watering down the power of public nuisance by making
it less different from personal injury analysis. Public nuisance
advocates have attempted to clarify the principled distinctions
between public nuisance claims arising out of public harms and
162. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 135 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005) (finding persuasive defendants’ argument “that plaintiff cannot
escape the requirement of showing causation in fact by stylizing a products
liability claim as a public nuisance action”).
163. See, e.g., Kairys, Origin and Development, supra note 128, at 1172
(“[P]reliminary research showed that product liability, I thought, was
problematic because handguns aren’t defective. That’s not the problem; they
work quite well—too well, by my light.”).
164. See Developments, supra note 118, at 1758–59 (describing municipal
suits against tobacco firms and handgun manufacturers as novel forms of
collectivization: “[S]uch litigation takes advantage of the civil law’s flexibility to
respond to newly recognized problems and exploits its substantive reach to go
beyond the crimes at issue to address their alleged underlying causes”). Public
nuisance suits differ from class action suits, however, in that class action suits
are fundamentally premised on the aggregation of individual claims, whereas
public nuisance suits are premised on a collective harm.
165. See generally Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and
Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91 (1995).
166. See generally Abrams & Washington, supra note 115; Steven Sarno, In
Search of a Cause: Addressing the Confusion in Proving Causation of a Public
Nuisance, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 225 (2009). See also People ex rel. Spitzer v.
Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 207 (App. Div. 2003) (Rosenburger, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion “appl[ies] an inapposite
negligence analysis to this case”).
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private claims arising out of similar harms to individuals. 167 But
many courts have remained unpersuaded. 168 The result is that
most courts have dismissed industry-wide public nuisance claims
without determining how best to define “public rights” as a
means of delineating the boundary between a properly alleged
public nuisance and other kinds of tort claims. 169
The public right element has been described as “the sine qua
non of a cause of action for public nuisance.” 170 It is grounded in
the same community-focused theory that animated the
foundation of American public health law. In his 1893 treatise on
the law of nuisance, H.G. Wood referred to public nuisance as “a
part of the great social compact to which every person is a party,
a fundamental and essential principle in every civilized
community, that every person yields a portion of his right of
absolute dominion.” 171 In the 1990s, the California Supreme
Court similarly defined public nuisance as an “interference with
collective social interests,” noting that it is this “community
aspect of the public nuisance . . . that distinguishes it from its
private cousin, and makes possible its use, by means of the
167. See, e.g., Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d at 134
Plaintiff asserts that because it is a governmental plaintiff it is not
required to identify which defendant manufactured the paint found
on each surface in Chicago where lead-based paint now constitutes a
hazard. . . . Plaintiff notes that, in the present case, it is not seeking
to recover for an injury to a particular person or property but,
instead, it is asserting the right of the public as a whole to be free
from threats to its health and safety.
168. See id. (rejecting the plaintiff’s causation analysis and, in doing so,
falling back on requiring a tie to property via the causation requirement).
“[T]here is no reported Illinois public nuisance case involving a viable lawsuit
brought by any municipality in which identification and causation, including the
specific location of the nuisance, were not known.” Id.
169. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1113
(Ill. 2005) (noting that although the majority of public nuisance firearms suits
had been dismissed on some grounds, no court had dismissed a public nuisance
suit against firearms manufacturers and distributors on the basis of “failure to
properly plead the existence of a public right affected by the alleged nuisance”).
170. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 39 (2002) (quoted in City of Chicago, 821
N.E.2d at 1115); see also City of Chicago, 821 N.E.2d at 1113–14 (“[T]he first
element that must be alleged to state a claim for public nuisance is the existence
of a right common to the general public.”).
171. H. WOOD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES IN THEIR
VARIOUS FORMS; INCLUDING REMEDIES THEREFORE AT LAW AND IN EQUITY § 1 (3d
ed. 1893).
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equitable injunction, to protect the quality of organized social
life.” 172 The court drew on the long history of nuisance doctrine,
noting that “[t]he public nuisance doctrine . . . embodies a kind of
collective ideal of civil life which the courts have vindicated by
equitable remedies since the beginning of the 16th century.” 173
Despite wide agreement that interference with a public right
is the central element of a public nuisance, 174 courts and
commentators have struggled in their attempts to use the public
right element as a means for defining the substantive scope of the
cause of action. The Restatement’s broad formulation of a public
nuisance as involving “a significant interference with the public
health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or
the public convenience” 175 has been widely quoted, but rarely
dispositive. 176 The criteria set forth in the second edition of
American Jurisprudence are only slightly more instructive. A
public nuisance “must affect an interest common to the general
public, must produce a common injury, or be dangerous or
injurious to the general public, or it must be harmful to the public
health, or prevent the public from a peaceful use of their land and
the public streets, or there must be some direct encroachment on
public property.” 177
In the context of recent litigation against the firearms and
lead paint industries, courts that have considered the application
of the public right requirement in detail have been split as to
whether public rights are implicated. Courts allowing public
nuisance claims to proceed have typically framed the public right
172. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 604 (Cal. 1997).
173. Id. at 603 (enjoining street gang members from conducting violent and
intimidating activities in a San Jose neighborhood).
174. See, e.g., Young v. Bryco Arms, 765 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)
(“The first element that a plaintiff must allege in order to state a claim for
public nuisance is the existence of ‘a right common to the general public.’”).
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
176. For the rare exception, see, for example, Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d
1191, 1209–10 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that California had adopted the
Restatement’s five categories of public rights, [public health, safety, peace,
comfort, or convenience] and then parroting without discussion the plaintiffs’
complaint that the plaintiffs’ gunshot injuries were violations of their public
rights to “health, safety, and welfare”).
177. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 39 (2002) (quoted in City of Chicago v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1115 (Ill. 2005)).
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at issue in broad terms that echo those of the Restatement. In
Young v. Bryco Arms (a firearms case), for example, an Illinois
court was swayed by the plaintiffs’ fairly broad assertion that
“the rights of plaintiffs and others to use the streets and public
ways without fear, apprehension and injury” 178 amounted to a
public right, but the same court renounced similar reasoning in a
subsequent case. 179 Similarly, in Lewis v. Lead Industries Ass’n (a
lead paint case), another Illinois court noted that “[t]he public
health and safety are common rights an interference with which
is sufficient to support a public nuisance claim.” 180 For the most
part, however, courts that have explicitly considered the public
right element have rejected such broad assertions. In a firearms
case, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a public right to be “free
from unreasonable jeopardy to health, welfare, and safety, and
from unreasonable threats of danger to person and property,
caused by the presence of illegal weapons in the city of
Chicago.” 181 Similarly, in overturning the jury verdict for the
plaintiffs in the Rhode Island lead paint case, the state Supreme
Court rejected the public right “to be free from the hazards of
unabated lead,” noting that “this contention falls far short of
alleging an interference with a public right as traditionally has
been understood in the law of public nuisance. The state’s
allegation that defendants have interfered with the ‘health,
safety, peace, comfort or convenience of the residents of the
[s]tate’ . . . standing alone does not constitute an allegation of
interference with a public right.” 182 This argument ignores nearuniversal adoption of the Restatement’s formulation of public
health as firmly entrenched within the scope of public rights. It
also disregards the role of state and local government officials
178. Bryco Arms, 765 N.E.2d at 11 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Other courts have held, however, that the concept of unreasonable
interference with public rights does not include the sale and distribution of
handguns that pose a threat to public safety. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 421–22 (3d Cir. 2002); Camden Cnty. Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 541–42 (3d Cir.
2001).
179. See infra note 206.
180. Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 793 N.E.2d 869, 878 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
181. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1114 (Ill.
2005).
182. State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 453 (R.I. 2008).
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suing in their parens patriae role, which has long been
understood to encompass public health protection.
IV. Theorizing the Public in Public Health and Public Nuisance
Although the theoretical debate over new public health law
and the doctrinal debate over industry-wide public nuisance
litigation have each generated substantial scholarly commentary,
no one has noted the parallels between them. 183 In both contexts,
as described above, designating a concern as “public” alters the
way in which it is balanced against protections for individual
rights and interests. To borrow William Novak’s formulation, the
public label designates “a special sphere of social activity, a
sphere distinctly cognizable as an object of governance.” 184 Both
debates have been triggered by advocates’ efforts to reach beyond
the immediate causes of modern social problems to address their
underlying roots. In doing so, advocates have attempted to make
use of venerable legal tools for addressing public problems. In
response to perceived overreaching, critics of a broader scope for
public health and public rights have argued for a more
circumscribed understanding of the “public.”
The linkages between industry-wide public nuisance
litigation and the new public health law movement are evident in
the writings of David Kairys, a legal scholar who played a
significant role in developing the public nuisance strategy against
the firearms industry. 185 Kairys’s account suggests that the
183. Although Epstein has written separately about public nuisance law, see
Richard A. Epstein, Federal Preemption, and Federal Common Law, in Nuisance
Cases, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 551, 559–60 (2008) (discussing property-based public
nuisance claims), he has not explicitly connected his two critiques. He
specifically includes “public nuisances like widespread pollution” as among the
proper objects of “old” public health law. But in his work on the scope of public
health law, he has not referred to public nuisance litigation against product
manufacturers. Epstein, In Defense of the “Old” Public Health, supra note 83, at
1425. In arguing that the “new” public health approach “extends regulation into
inappropriate areas,” Epstein does, however, refer specifically to the regulation
of product markets. Id.
184. NOVAK, supra note 31, at 86.
185. Kairys, Origin and Development, supra note 128, at 1163. The public
nuisance litigation strategy was first developed in Philadelphia, but the mayor
of Philadelphia eventually backed away from filing suit and chose instead to
collaborate with the National Rifle Association to lobby for additional federal

252

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207 (2012)

strategy arose out of exactly the sort of “root cause” analysis that
the ecological model of public health has sought to promote.
Kairys explains that in 1996, he was asked to serve alongside
police officers, prosecutors, and community activists on a gun
violence taskforce for the city of Philadelphia. The group also
included police officers, prosecutors, and community and religious
activists. They sought to address gun violence, not as a
“regrettably normal phenomenon in our society,” but rather as an
“intolerable, unacceptable” problem that they sought to “figure
out.” 186 Ultimately, the taskforce traced gun violence to an
environment in which guns are readily available on the black
market, thanks to the distribution practices of gun
manufacturers and their wholesale distributors. 187
The distinction between the product liability strategy and the
public nuisance strategy maps nicely onto the contrasting models
of public health described above. Products liability claims aimed
at altering the design of particular firearms, for example, are
more in line with an agent model of gun violence. If the gun is the
agent that causes injury, then the solution is to alter the gun
itself. The individually-oriented causation analysis applied to
products liability also maps onto the agent model of public health
by focusing on establishing clear ties between specific causes and
specific outcomes. On the other hand, public nuisance claims
against the firearms industry as a whole to address marketing
and distribution practices that influence where guns are located
is more in keeping with an ecological model. The public nuisance
suits put forward understanding of harmful products like
firearms as posing “an environmental threat as well as [being] the
object of a series of commercial transactions that caused a
clustering of individual illnesses through product exposure.” 188
Kairys, in his role as public nuisance advocate, explicitly
turned to the terminology of public health to describe the
firearms market:
funds for law enforcement. The strategy was quickly picked up by other city and
state governments, however. See Carl T. Bogus, Gun Litigation and Societal
Values, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1353, 1353–56 (2000).
186. Kairys, Origin and Development, supra note 128, at 1164.
187. Id. at 1173.
188. GIFFORD, supra note 99, at 84 (emphasis added).
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What was clear to me was that the . . . moving force for
demand in this industry is fear. You can think of it as an
epidemic, as the public health people might think of it, but it’s
an epidemic that’s spread not by a virus or a bacteria. It’s an
epidemic that’s spread by fear. And unlike most epidemics, the
cause is also posed as the solution. The solution—more guns—
just further spreads the epidemic. 189

This use of the term “epidemic” with respect to noncommunicable threats to health has been decried by Epstein as
fostering a predisposition toward government intrusion as an
appropriate response. 190 For Epstein, modern public health
epidemics like obesity and diabetes are not “epidemics” at all.
Indeed, Epstein points to the epidemic label as having
implications similar to those of the public label: “There are no
non-communicable epidemics. . . . [T]he designation of obesity as
a public health epidemic is designed to signal that state coercion
is appropriate, and it is just that connection that is missing.” 191
Writing about the scope of public health law, Hall cautions that
the public health perspective tends toward a “habit of thought”
whereby “having identified a causal connection to a widespread
health problem, action is necessary to eradicate the cause and
eliminate the problem at its source, and it falls within the
authority of public health or other government officials to take
the necessary actions.” He could just as easily have been
describing David Kairys’s story about the gun violence task force.
The efforts of public health and public nuisance critics to
theorize a narrower vision of the public have proceeded from the
presumption that it must be more than the mere aggregation of
individual interests, rights, or harms. Efforts to define what this
“something more” might be have thus far proceeded along two
main paths. Some have turned to theoretically specious means for
designating a private sphere in which harms cannot be conceived
of as “public.” Others have turned to the conception of indivisible
public goods. Both conceptions lead to relatively narrow grounds
of justification for restraints on liberty, even in the hands of
proponents of a broader understanding of public health. 192
189.
190.
191.
192.

Kairys, Origin and Development, supra note 128, at 1167–68.
Epstein, supra note 11, at S154.
Id.
See Bruce Jennings, Public Health and Liberty: Beyond the Millian
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A. Aggregation Is Insufficient

Hall has described the “key insight” of his critique of public
health law as follows: “in the legal arena, public has a specialized
meaning that is quite different from ordinary parlance. In the
legal arena, public does not simply mean ‘widespread.’” 193 Pope
puts a similar insight in terms of identifying an appropriate
liberty limiting principle for public health interventions. He notes
the argument by Mary Ann Glendon and others that many
behaviors that are seemingly purely self-regarding behaviors
(those posing no risk of harm to others and thus properly
conceived of as “private”) in fact impose economic costs on society
in the form of medical expenses and lost productivity. But Pope
disputes this as a justification for government intrusion: “[W]hile
there may be cases in which aggregate de minimus self-regarding
harm becomes collective harm, more is needed before the mere
invocation of ‘the community’ justifies limiting liberty.” 194
Ironically, Dan Beauchamp, a pioneer in theorizing the
ethical foundations of the ecological model of public health, 195
expressed a similar sentiment in championing a broad conception
of public health. And he did so decades before Hall and Epstein
offered the same notion as a critique.
The public or the people were presumed to have an interest,
held in common, in self-protection or preservation from threats
of all kinds to their welfare. . . . The central principles
underlying the police or regulatory power were the treatment
of health and safety as a shared purpose and need of the
community and (aside from basic constitutional rights such as
due process) the subordination of the market, property, and
Paradigm, PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 2, no. 2, 131 (2009) (“[P]ublic health ethics must
go beyond the Millian paradigm and its individualism.”). The author also notes
that “the normative justification for public health practice outside a very narrow
range” cannot be sustained. Id. at 130.
193. Hall, supra note 65, at S204.
194. Pope, supra note 9, at 32.
195. See, e.g., Dan E. Beauchamp, Public Health As Social Justice, in NEW
ETHICS FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 101, 101 (Dan E. Beauchamp & Bonnie
Steinbock eds., 1999) (article originally appeared in 1976) (“[O]ur most
intractable public problems . . . result in significant part from arrangements
that are providing substantial benefits or advantages to a majority or to a
powerful minority of citizens. . . . It is not sufficiently appreciated that these
same bleak realities plague attempts to protect the public’s health.”).
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individual liberty to protect compelling community
interests. . . . In this scheme, public health and safety are not
simply the aggregate of each private individual’s interest in
health and safety, interests which can be pursued more
effectively through collective action. 196

Notably for my purposes, Beauchamp’s statement could just as
easily have been written in reference to the definition of public
rights in public nuisance law.
This rejection of the public as merely “widespread” has been
equally crucial in courts’ and commentators’ rejection of the
existence of a public right in the firearms and lead paint
litigation. Courts have expressed the idea that aggregated private
harms are not grounds for a public rights public nuisance claim.
For example, in City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., the court
“quer[ied] whether the public right asserted by plaintiffs is
merely an assertion, on behalf of the entire community, of the
individual right not to be assaulted.” 197 Similarly, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, in In re Lead Paint Litigation, expressed
skepticism as to “whether the condition addressed [lead paint
exposure] truly affects a common right rather than merely
affecting many people.” 198 In overturning a jury verdict holding
lead paint manufacturers liable for contributing to a public
nuisance, the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that the
meaning of public right could not be so broad as “to encompass all
behavior that causes a widespread interference with the private
rights of numerous individuals.” 199
The collective–individual distinction is referenced in a
comment to the Restatement, which cautions that a public right
“is collective in nature and not like the individual right that
everyone has not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or
negligently injured.” Donald Gifford and others have built on this
196. Dan Beauchamp, Community: The Neglected Tradition of Public
Health, 15 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28, 29 (1985) (emphasis added).
197. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1115 (Ill.
2005) (holding defendants’ marketing of firearms did not constitute a public
nuisance in Illinois).
198. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 501 (N.J. 2007). Ultimately,
however, the court deferred to the legislature’s interpretation of a broader
meaning of “common right” that would encompass a public nuisance created by
lead paint and dismissed the claim on other grounds. Id.
199. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 453 (2008).
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distinction to argue that conduct that harms a large number of
people does not necessarily interfere with a public right. In many
cases, widespread harms are better understood as a simple
aggregation of individual harms without any special significance
for communal interests. Gifford uses the example of
contaminated hamburgers to illustrate the point:
Even if the owners of a fast-food chain were to sell millions of
defectively produced hamburgers causing harm to millions of
people who ate them, the violation of rights is a series of
separate violations of private rights—typical tort or contract
rights that the consumers might have—not a violation of the
rights of the general public, or of the public as the public. The
sheer number of violations does not transform the harm from
individual injury to communal injury. 200

The critics of new public health would likely take issue with
Gifford’s characterization of contaminated meat as not within the
legitimate corpus of distinctly public harms. They have typically
included actions to ensure the safety of the food supply as among
the legitimate functions of “old” public health. 201 The devil, it
seems, is in the details—if the “public” requires something more
than simple aggregation, then how should that “something more”
be defined and theorized?
B. Public Spaces
Gifford’s conception of the public appears to rely on a notion
that at least some problems cannot properly be deemed public
simply by virtue of their originating in private places at the
hands of private actors. In 2003, Gifford wrote that “[p]roducts
generally are purchased and used by individual consumers. Any
harm they cause—even if the use of the product is widespread
and the manufacturer’s or distributor’s conduct is unreasonable—
200. GIFFORD, supra note 99, at 146; see also In re Lead Paint Litig., 924
A.2d at 501. In re Lead Paint Litig. expressed skepticism as to whether lead
paint poisoning “truly affects a common right rather than merely affecting many
people,” but ultimately deferred to the legislature’s interpretation of a broader
meaning of “common right” that would encompass a public nuisance created by
lead paint. Id.
201. See Hall, supra note 65, at S204.
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is not an actionable violation of a public right.” 202 For Gifford,
there is nothing public about contaminated hamburgers
consumed in privately owned establishments by individual
consumers. His commentary has been particularly influential in
the lead paint cases. In critiquing the lead paint public nuisance
claims, Gifford argues that “[t]he concept of public right as that
term has been understood in the law of public nuisance does not
appear to be broad enough to encompass the right of a child who
is lead-poisoned as a result of exposure to deteriorated lead-based
paint in private residences or child-care facilities operated by
private owners.” 203 His reasoning is baffling to anyone familiar
with the critical deconstruction of the public–private distinction:
“Despite the tragic nature of the child’s illness, the exposure to
lead-based paint usually occurs within the most private and
intimate of surroundings, his or her own home.” 204 Feminist
scholars and others have harshly and thoroughly critiqued the
carving out of the home as a private sphere in which the public
interest should have no influence. 205 Nonetheless, Gifford’s
reasoning is apparently appealing to courts, at least two of which
have quoted the above language in dismissing lead paint
nuisance claims. 206
202. GIFFORD, supra note 99, at 146.
203. Id. at 147.
204. Id.; see also Faulk & Gray, supra note 113, at 983–84 (“[T]he alleged
problems did not threaten the exercise of any rights held by the public at large,
such as the use of public buildings or resources, but rather related to the
exercise of private rights by private individuals in their private abodes.”).
205. See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1992).
206. So influential, in fact, that the same Illinois Appeals Court that had
accepted a broad reading of public rights in an earlier case, Lewis v. Lead
Industries Ass’n, Inc. 793 N.E.2d 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003), was so swayed by
Gifford’s reasoning and the defense arguments inspired by it, that it renounced
Lewis’s conclusion in a subsequent case. See City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid
Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 132–33 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). The court quoted Gifford and
noted:
[P]laintiff alleges that the nuisance, if one exists, occurs in
unidentified buildings owned by private property owners. Defendants
argue that plaintiff’s allegations implicate an assortment of claimed
private individual rights that do not belong to the public at large
because the alleged conditions exist within private homes, which the
general public has no right to enter, and therefore do not interfere
with any “public right.”
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Gifford applies similar reasoning to tobacco litigation. He
rejects the argument that public nuisance liability could attach to
harms experienced by primary smokers, but he draws a
distinction when it comes to harms associated with secondhand
smoke, on quite unconventional grounds: “Conceivably, a victim
of tobacco related-illness who could prove that her disease
resulted from ‘second-hand’ smoke, particularly in public places
such as public parks or while walking on public thoroughfares,
could satisfy this first requirement of public nuisance.” 207 The
typical distinction between being the primary smoker and being
exposed to secondhand smoke is that self-protection (choosing not
to smoke) is not possible for the person exposed to secondhand
smoke. Gifford’s emphasis on the notion that harms associated
with secondhand smoke are particularly actionable through
public nuisance where the exposure occurs in “public parks” or
“public thoroughfares” offers a novel spin on that distinction.
Gifford’s focus on public spaces may also provide some
explanation for his acceptance of the public right argument with
respect to the firearms litigation. 208 Perhaps Gifford is swayed by
the framing of the public right violation in the firearms litigation
as interference with the public’s “peaceful use of public streets,
sidewalks, parks, and other public places.” 209 In any case, this
place-based view of the public–private distinction has not taken
hold among the liberal critics of new public health. Even Epstein
agrees that environmental pollution and contamination of the
food supply are legitimate concerns of his favored “old” public
health. 210 Presumably this holds for Epstein even when these
Id. at 132. Somewhat confusingly, the court also acknowledged, however, that
“[a] public nuisance is actionable even where the nuisance is present on private
property.” Id. at 133. Ultimately, the court avoided the issue by dismissing the
case on proximate cause grounds. Id.; see also In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d
at 495.
207. Gifford, Public Nuisance, supra note 160, at 817.
208. Id.
209. City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 296, 349
(E.D.N.Y 2007) (holding the City of New York had sufficiently pled a public
nuisance claim against out-of-state firearm retailers).
210. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Principles of Environmental
Protection: The Case of Superfund, 2 CATO J. 9, 33–34 (1982) (suggesting that
“government . . . be given broad and immediate powers to clean up and
regulate existing [environmentally hazardous dumps or spills]” because “they
present the greatest threats of large-scale pollution and the greatest obstacles
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threats are experienced by people within private homes or as a
result of purchases from private businesses.
C. Public Goods
A more theoretically sound basis for the public–private
distinction is offered by Epstein and Hall, who have emphasized
the indivisible nature of public goods (such as clean air or herd
immunity) in defining what it is that sets the truly public apart
from the aggregation of private concerns. Epstein, not
unexpectedly, defines the difference between “old” public health
and new public health in economic terms:
For its part, the old public health tracks the idea of public
goods in economics, namely, those non-excludable goods that
cannot be supplied to one unless they are also given to
another. . . . It thus invokes an analogous concept for “public
bads”: those harms inflicted on others without their consent,
as, for example, both communicable diseases and pollution. 211

By contrast, in Epstein’s view, modern public health has become
“unmoored from the economic conception of a (non-excludable)
public good.” 212 Similarly, Hall has argued that “[i]n the legal
arena, public . . . invokes a special set of justifications for
government intervention and coercion that rely on concepts that
economists refer to as ‘public goods.’” 213 Proponents of public
health intervention have also described public health in terms of
protecting public goods. Michael Walzer, for example, defined
public health law as “focus[ing] on the provision and protection of
public goods, without specific allocation to individuals. 214
to private relief”); Richard A. Epstein, Eggs and Avastin, FORBES (Aug. 23,
2010, 11:34 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/08/23/fda-eggs-salmonellaopinions-columnists-richard-a-epstein.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2012)
(arguing that the FDA should refocus its efforts and resources towards
traditional public health concerns such as preventing contamination in the
food supply) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
211. Epstein, supra note 11, at S139.
212. Id. at S148.
213. Hall, supra note 65, at S204. Hall goes on to discuss how public health
officials, overstepping this public good distinction, might “use their vast legal
authority to try to solve problems that are not collective action problems” and
terms this behavior “the public fallacy.” Id. at S205.
214. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
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Similarly, James Childress and Ruth Gaare Bernheim have
written that “[t]he health of the public is a public good because it
is not just the sum of individual health indices and cannot be
attained through individual actions alone.” 215 For Hall and
Epstein, however, the public goods criteria amounts to a narrow
justification for “old” public health measures to address
communicable infectious disease threats, pollution of the natural
environment, and contaminated food. 216
A parallel argument has been made with respect to public
nuisance law. Modern courts and commentators have read early
cases as limiting the recognition of public rights to “those
indivisible resources shared by the public at large, such as air,
water, or public rights of way.” 217 This conception of public rights
EQUALITY 2 (1983).
215. James F. Childress & Ruth Gaare Bernheim, Beyond the Liberal and
Communitarian Impasse: A Framework and Vision for Public Health, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 1191, 1195 (2003).
216. See Hall, supra note 65, at S204
The classic subjects of public health law are communicable diseases,
personal hygiene, sanitary water and sewer systems, safe food, and
injury prevention. These disparate situations all involve significant
collective action problems, meaning that individuals acting in their
own self-interest, even if fully informed and rational, will not
effectively address the problem because they do not internalize some
of the major costs or benefits of action or non-action, or for other
reasons a centralized response is much more cost-effective. . . .
Identifying and eliminating the source of contagion for a
communicable disease requires more effort and cost than any one
individual or small group is likely to undertake. A public agency is
necessary to garner the resources needed for collective action and to
wield the authority for coercive restrictions on liberty or property.
217. State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 454 (R.I. 2008) (“The term
public right is reserved more appropriately for those indivisible resources
shared by the public at large, such as air, water, or public rights of way.”) (citing
City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 131, 139 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005)); see also Graham Oil Co. v. BP Oil Co., 885 F. Supp. 716, 723 (W.D. Penn.
1994) (including the rights to soil and water free of contamination as public
rights); City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 908–
09 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (comparing plaintiffs’ assertion of a public “right to be free
from guns and violence” to a public right to unpolluted water and then rejecting
the plaintiffs’ argument), aff’d, 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002); Philadelphia Elec.
Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 316 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding the right to pure
water is a public right); Celanese Corp. v. Coastal Water Auth., 475 F. Supp. 2d
623, 639 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (listing the enjoyment of clean air and water as
examples of public rights); Gifford, Public Nuisance, supra note 160, at 793
(noting that “the obstruction of highways or diversion of watercourses” are
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as public goods first emerged from the application of public
nuisance to environmental pollution. It harkens back to nuisance
cases that recognized rights to clean air and water and safe and
unobstructed use of public rights of way, but it fails to reach back
to the earlier conception of collectively held rights to public
health and welfare out of which those more specific
environmental rights arose. The application of public nuisance to
problems like lead paint in homes and the illegal firearms market
put pressure on the public goods formulation. As described above,
advocates and courts have increasingly eschewed broad
statements of a right to public health and welfare in favor of
narrower (and increasingly awkward) assertions of rights to
specific public goods stated in affirmative terms. Recently
asserted public goods include “a climate that will not drastically
change as a result of greenhouse gas ‘pollution,’ thereby
devastating the ecology and the human population” 218 and “the
benefits of the laws governing the unlawful possession and use of
firearms.” 219 When the interests at issue are framed so narrowly,
it’s not difficult to see why courts have been quick to dismiss the
argument that they are protected by longstanding common law
rights.
V. Epidemiological Harms as Public Bads
The implementation of measures that integrate new public
health science and practice into public health law and policy is
proceeding rapidly. Measures aimed at altering the social
environment in ways that influence health behaviors and outcomes
are supported by public health science, 220 but they are perhaps
rushing ahead of adequate theorization in terms of values other
than population health. For the most part, the defense of new public
classic public nuisances).
218. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 367 (2d Cir. 2009),
rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (holding that the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et
seq. and the EPA action authorized by the Act displace any federal common-law
right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power
plants).
219. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1115 (Ill.
2004).
220. See generally GOSTIN, supra note 67.
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health law has relied on the overarching value of health as the
justification for placing community needs on equal footing with
individual rights. But this vision is in tension with the liberal
foundations of American law, which require rigorous justification of
community needs before they are allowed to trump individual
rights. What is required is a middle position between critics, who
support only the narrowest articulation of public health law as the
law of communicable disease control, and defenders of new public
health, who appear to understand any widespread health problem
as legitimately falling within the purview of public health law.
Designating a concern as a public health threat has important
legal consequences. To the extent that the public is invoked as a
liberty-limiting principle, 221 it should be thoughtfully defined and
theorized. The problem, of course, is defining what special quality
marks an interest as sufficiently collective or communal, beyond the
large number of people affected. The justification provided by the
public–goods and public–places theories of the public are
dissatisfying in their narrowness. I propose that part of the solution
to more fully theorizing the public as a justification for public health
intervention is supplementation of the public goods formulation
with an enhanced conception of public bads. This enhanced
conception moves beyond a purely economic understanding by
drawing on the science of epidemiology. I argue that epidemiological
harms—those for which causation can be established at the
population level, but which cannot necessarily be traced to any
individual victim—should be understood as public bads. This
conception offers an expanded understanding of the public as a
221. This is a hugely important caveat. An important response to the liberal
critique of “new” public health law is that many of the legal tools that it
promotes are not coercive. Hall’s description of why environmental and
occupational health regulations are not troubling—that they “affect primarily
only property or economic interests, not personal liberty”—also applies to many
“new” public health legal interventions to address threats like obesity. Hall,
supra note 65, at S207. A longer discussion of the extent to which particular
“new” public health law tools are coercive enough to even require a robust
liberty-limiting principle is outside of the scope of this Article. See Gostin &
Bloche, supra note 72, at S172 (“The ‘new’ public health is less coercive, in the
conventional sense, than its 19th-century regulatory antecedents. It eschews
physical compulsion, such as quarantine and coerced therapy, except as a lastditch step, and it sees synergies between health promotion and respect for
human rights.”). In this Article, however, I am concerned with those instances
in which the “public” is invoked to justify significant state intrusion.
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justification for public health intervention. It also promotes an even
firmer rooting of public health law and policy in the science and
practice of new public health, rather than seeking (as Hall and
Epstein do) to divide the politics of public health from its science.
A. A Broader Conception of the Public
In a subtle but fundamental way, the division between science
and law championed by Hall and Epstein would disconnect public
health from the explicitly progressive mission that has been integral
to its disciplinary identity for centuries. The dichotomy relied upon
by Hall and Epstein misses important distinctions within the
discipline of public health. “Eliminating threats to public health” 222
involves multiple activities. This project is far from solely “the
domain” 223 of law. There are at least four broad categories of activity
at issue here: science, practice, policy, and law. The lines are
necessarily blurred among them. It is not possible for the science of
public health (the activity of “[a]dvancing understanding and
knowledge of the causes and patterns of health conditions in
society”) 224 to exist in a vacuum. The questions it seeks to answer
(and the answers it eventually provides) are informed by practice,
policy, and law. The scientific identification of causal pathways is
intimately tied to the policy work of developing and evaluating
potential interventions to disrupt them. The practice of public
health (by which I mean the activity of implementing interventions
to protect and promote health, only some of which make use of legal
tools) is useless unless it is informed by science and guided by policy.
And public health policy (by which I mean the body of defined
objectives of public health science and practice) easily blends into
the law, in which it is expressed. As Daniel Goldberg has written in
response to the critique of new public health put forth by Mark
Rothstein, “either the social epidemiologists’ contention that
socioeconomic disparities are a primary factor in causing good public
health is accurate, or it is not.”225
222. Hall, supra note 65, at S202.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Daniel S. Goldberg, In Support of a Broad Model of Public Health:
Disparities, Social Epidemiology and Public Health Causation, 2 PUB. HEALTH
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[I]f socioeconomic disparities are truly productive of public
health, policies consistent with the narrow model, which by
definition do nothing to ameliorate social conditions, will do little
to actually improve health in the aggregate. . . . If public health
practice is not intended to facilitate the public’s health, it is
unclear what use such practice has and why public monies
should be forthcoming to support it. 226

To the extent that the liberal critics of new public health seek to
apply a narrow definition to all efforts to “eliminat[e] threats to
public health,” 227 their critique would disconnect not only public
health law, but also public health policy and practice, from the
progressive mission of improving population health.
The formulation of public health and public rights as limited to
securing public goods ignores the wider diversity of harms that
public health law and public nuisance law have been used to
address, not just in the past decade, but for centuries. Earlier courts
addressing public nuisances in the form of vicious dogs, 228
fireworks,229 and snake handling230 were far more comfortable with
broad statements of the state’s authority to enjoin and seek redress
for unreasonable interferences with public health and welfare. In
State ex rel. Swann v. Pack,231 for example, the Tennessee Supreme
Court defined a public nuisance as “a condition of things which is
prejudicial to the health, comfort, safety, property, sense of decency,
or morals of the citizens at large, resulting either from an act not
warranted by law, or from neglect of a duty imposed by law.” 232 In
ETHICS 70, 73 (2009).
226. Id. at 75.
227. Hall, supra note 65, at S202.
228. See Village of Northbrook v. Cannon, 377 N.E.2d 1208, 1210–13 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1978) (upholding conviction for permitting dogs to run uncontrolled
thereby causing a nuisance in violation of village’s animal control ordinance).
229. See PPC Enterprises, Inc. v. Texas City, 76 F. Supp. 2d 750, 760 (S.D.
Tex. 1999) (upholding city ordinance prohibiting the sale, possession, or use of
fireworks within 5,000 feet of the city given the existence of a Texas statute
authorizing a “‘municipality [to] define and prohibit any nuisance within the
limits of the municipality and within 5,000 feet outside its limits’” (quoting TEX.
LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 217.042(a))).
230. See State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 113 (Tenn. 1975)
(enjoining a pastor from handling snakes as part of a religious service on the
grounds that it is a common-law nuisance).
231. Id.
232. Id.
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holding that the defendants’ practice of snake handling amounted to
a public nuisance, the court apparently felt no need to assert a
narrow public right to a community free of unrestrained venomous
snakes.233 Rather, it emphasized the impact of this practice on the
safety of the community as a whole in broad terms. 234 When some
state legislatures codified public nuisance law around the turn of
the century, they too framed their definitions of nuisance in ways
that relied heavily on a broad conception of collective interests in
public health and welfare.235 The state’s police power—its authority
and responsibility for securing the public’s health and welfare—has
always been greater in scope than the liberal critique suggests.
The great appeal of public nuisance for advocates eager to take
on problems like the illegal gun market, the contamination of urban
housing stock with lead paint, and climate change is that (in theory
at least) it allows plaintiffs to establish causation at the population,
rather than individual, level. The doctrinal framework that should
make this possible is liberty-limiting in its own way. 236 By allowing
for recovery of damages and or injunctive relief against private
actors in the absence of proof that traces the actions of any
individual defendant to the harms suffered by any individual
person, public nuisance arguably threatens to infringe on economic
liberty. But for decades, centuries even, this intrusion has been
deemed acceptable based on the notion of the state’s role (through
the courts as well as through governmental plaintiffs representing
the executive branch) in protecting the uniquely collective interest
in healthy living conditions. In many cases, this collective interest
has been framed in terms of the natural environment—as in cases
involving air or water pollution. But in others it has been
understood in terms of the built environment—as in cases involving
obstruction of roadways or watercourses, for example. And even the
social environment has been implicated in cases involving gang
violence, snake handling, or brothels. The collectively held public
rights recognized in the common law of public nuisance allow for
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 2011) (originally enacted in
1872).
236. See generally Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 165, at 98–112
(discussing the competing liberty and security interests implicated in liability
rules).
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vindication of harms that are suffered by the public as a whole,
harms that cannot easily be broken down into an aggregation of
private harms. In a public nuisance cause of action the plaintiff may
be able to establish that the defendant’s actions have contributed to
unhealthy living conditions, which have resulted in harms that are
quantifiable at the population level by epidemiologists, even if the
plaintiff cannot establish that any particular individual is
identifiable as the victim of those harms. It is out of this vision of
public nuisance that I draw my proposal of epidemiological harms as
a supplement to the economic conception of public bads.
B. The Economic Conception of Public Bads
Traditionally, public bads have been understood in economic
terms. In nuisance law, for example, the distinction between a
private nuisance and a public one can be understood in terms of the
distinction between private bads and public bads.237 Private bads
are “external costs that affect, and are confined to, easily defined
economic agents.” 238 The classic private nuisance example is that of
a factory that is spewing soot and ashes on clothes strung up to dry
at the neighboring laundry. The doctrine of public nuisance gives a
private right of action to the owner of the laundry, which allows him
or her to negotiate with the owner of the factory. But the same
approach doesn’t work for public bads. The nature of a public bad “is
such that there is no low-cost way to insulate and partition the
affected individuals in the group from the negative effect. What one
group member receives, all receive.” 239 For example, if an entire
village is affected by emissions from a local copper smelter, there is
a free rider problem posed by the potential use of a private cause of
action by any individual homeowner. Because any solution (in the
form of abating the pollution) would benefit everyone equally,
whether they had helped bear the costs of litigation or not, it is
difficult for any individual homeowner to bring suit. “The cost of
organizing and the tendency for individuals to free ride works
against the individual’s success.”240
237.
238.
239.
240.

Boudreaux & Yandle, supra note 116, at 52–66.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 61.
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This concept of public bads as indivisible negative externalities
is intimately linked to the economic concept of public goods that has
played a prominent role in public health law and public nuisance
law. It is perhaps more natural to describe the copper smelter
problem in negative terms that focus on the public nature of the
harm suffered by the homeowners of the village, rather than in
affirmative terms that focus on a right to the public good of clean
air, but the concept is essentially the same. Both ways of thinking
about the problem emphasize economic concerns about collective
action. Public health can also be conceptualized in these terms.
Advocates of the new public health have identified the central
importance of economic concepts like public goods and negative
externalities in defining the scope of public health law at the
beginning of its modern revival. “Public health . . . has as its chief
duty the unenviable tasks of providing common goods and
controlling negative externalities, both difficult at best.”241 The herd
immunity achieved through compulsory vaccination programs is
readily understood as a public good that requires individual
sacrifices for the common benefit. By contrast, it is more difficult to
frame “lifestyle” diseases—which we have been conditioned to think
of in terms of individual behavior choices—in terms of public goods.
In response to Hall’s and Epstein’s critiques, Lawrence Gostin and
Gregg Bloche have emphasized the continued role of externality
analysis in justifying governmental responses to environmental
toxins, insufficient time and space for exercise, and nutritionally
adequate food in public schools.”242 They have also pointed to
insufficient information about health risks, and the ability of private
industry to influence people’s preferences through marketing efforts.
This statement provides a helpful starting point, but it fails to fully
elaborate a substantive response to the liberal critique. For the most
part, the Gostin/Bloche response focuses on revealing the classical
liberal politics that underlies the emerging critique. But that only
takes us so far.

241.
242.

Gostin et al., supra note 23, at 68.
Gostin & Bloche, supra note 72, at S165.
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C. An Epidemiological Conception of Public Bads

The population focus of epidemiology provides a unique lens for
analyzing legal problems, similar to that provided by economics. 243 I
propose that “epidemiological harms”—which I define as those for
which causation can be established at the population level, but
which are not necessarily traceable to any particular individual as
either cause or victim 244—should be understood as a type of public
bad. A fundamental tension in the application of tort law as a tool
for protecting the public’s health is that “the most potent
determinants of a disease or injury are often those that are distal
and incidental, observable only by comparing the incidence of a
disease or injury in one population to that in another population
which is not exposed to that variable.” 245 As my examination of
industry-wide public nuisance litigation indicates, tort law has
struggled to find an appropriate framework for adjudicating claims
arising out of these kinds of harms. For a variety of reasons, it is
also difficult to motivate sufficient political will to address these
harms, even when there is substantial scientific evidence
documenting their burden on society. 246
My vision of epidemiological harms as public bads builds on the
social epidemiological evidence that problematizes the voluntariness
of supposedly “personal” health behavior choices. The classical
understanding of public bads defines them primarily as indivisible
harms inflicted on the public without consent. 247 Epidemiological
243. See generally PARMET, supra note 22.
244. Cf. id. at 228–38 (describing the difficulties of using tort law to address
harms that can be proven at the population level); Samuel Issacharoff, Private
Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 185, 215–20 (discussing the
harms caused by Vioxx, which were subject only to epidemiological proof, as
among a category of “underlying substantive claims which, either formally or as
a practical matter, do not fit within the framework of identifiably individual
claims”).
245. See PARMET, supra note 22, at 228.
246. See Neiman, supra note 69, at 226–31, 240–43 (discussing the strong
resistance to mandatory motorcycle helmet laws by motorcycle enthusiasts
despite overwhelming evidence that helmets significantly decrease the
morbidity and mortality rates associated with motorcycle accidents); Hodge &
Eber, supra note 69, at 520–21 (discussing strategies and obstacles to enacting
and implementing tobacco-control legislation).
247. See Epstein, In Defense of the Old Public Health, supra note 83, at 1426
(“In contrast to public goods, public bads are inflicted upon others without their
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harms can be partly conceptualized in similar terms, but in a way
that is informed by social epidemiology. Ultimately, it comes down
to how the harm is framed. If the public bad at issue in the obesity
epidemic is the ingestion of large quantities of high-calorie, lownutrient food, then it is difficult to conceive of that interaction
between the individual consumer and the food he or she eats in
terms of an “indivisible” harm imposed without consent. On the
other hand, if the public bad at issue here is an information and food
environment that has been shown to increase obesity at the
population level, the calculus looks different. There is no meaningful
consent to the overrepresentation of fast food outlets and
underrepresentation of full service grocery stores in low-income
neighborhoods. There is no meaningful consent to exposure to
advertising on the sides of city busses extolling the virtues of dollarmenu cheeseburgers. Social epidemiology also suggests that these
harms are indivisible, in much the same way that the pollution
emitted from a copper smelting mill affects an entire community.
Scientific study can establish links between the social environment
and health outcomes at the population level, but not at the
individual level.
Protecting public health also requires actions that no individual
is fully incentivized to take, even if it were within one’s power to do
so, because it is impossible to know which individuals will benefit.
Indeed, the collective action problem in public health is the very root
of its frequent politicization. Geoffrey Rose, a prominent
epidemiologist, characterized the central dilemma of public health
as the “prevention paradox.” 248 Interventions that have the greatest
potential to improve health at the population level are virtually
always impossible to link to individual benefits. We know that
convincing people not to use tobacco saves lives. We can document
how many fewer people are smoking today than were smoking in
consent, as are communicable diseases and pollution, but not obesity or genetic
diseases.”); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Public’s Right to Health: When
Patient Rights Threaten the Commons, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1335, 1391–92 (2009)
(“Smoking
bans
are
consistent
with
traditional
public
health
interventions . . . because smoking in public is a ‘public bad.’ Its effects are
imposed broadly on others, without their consent.”).
248. Rose, supra note 18, at 42 (“[T]he population strategy of prevention has
also some weighty drawbacks. It offers only a small benefit to each individual
since most of them were going to be all right [sic] anyway, at least for many
years. This leads to the prevention paradox.”).
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the 1960s. 249 We can even document the impact of cigarette taxes on
smoking prevention. 250 But it is impossible to point to any
individual and say “this person’s life was saved because the
cigarette tax was high enough to keep her from taking up smoking.”
Similarly, we know that exposure to deteriorating lead paint causes
intellectual impairment. We can document how many children have
blood lead levels that are unsafe. At the population level, we may
even be able to estimate how much intellectual disability is
attributable to lead paint exposure. But it is exceedingly difficult to
prove that any given individual would not be intellectually disabled
but for her exposure to lead paint.
By framing the issue in terms of the nonconsensual and
indivisible nature of the social, economic, and environmental
determinants of health, the epidemiological harms concept offers an
approach to incorporating a communitarian vision of public health
within a predominantly liberal legal framework. The liberal
framework tends to discount social, economic, and environmental
influences on individual choice in its efforts to emphasize the
importance of individual autonomy. This position is no longer fully
tenable in the public health context, in light of the findings of social
epidemiologists. Epstein’s and Hall’s arguments for a division
between the science and the law of public health do not present a
viable solution to this conundrum. Rather, the solution is to root
new public health law more deeply in the science of social
epidemiology. Legal advocates must find more compelling ways to
convey the power of scientific insights about the social, economic,
and environmental determinants of health. These insights
ultimately provide the strongest source of support for understanding
an expanding range of health threats as legitimately public in
nature and as amenable to structural solutions.

249. Betsy McKay, Downward Trend in Smoking Rate Stalls, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 13, 2009, at A3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
125804680667345609.html (stating that 20.6% of American adults were
smokers in 2009, down from around 40% in the mid-1960s).
250. See generally Hana Ross & Frank J. Chaloupka, The Effect of Cigarette
Prices on Youth Smoking, 12 HEALTH ECON. 217 (2003), available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/hec.709/pdf (examining the effect of
cigarette prices on youth smoking and concluding that higher cigarette prices
reduce the probability of youth cigarette smoking).
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VI. Conclusion
The emerging liberal critique of new public health law has far
reaching implications. It calls into question the full range of
strategies for using law as a tool to address modern public health
threats outside of communicable diseases, environmental pollution,
and contaminated food. Liberal critics apply their reasoning to “fat
taxes,” 251 tanning bed taxes, 252 litigation against food
manufacturers or retailers,253 tobacco control strategies that seek to
associate social stigma with smoking, 254 anti-poverty policies aimed
at reducing health disparities,255 seat belt laws, firearms regulation,
regulation of alcohol consumption, parental abuse and neglect,
consumer product safety, and regulation of the fast food industry. 256
In many ways, the failed efforts of public health advocates—of
“epidemiologists as litigators”—to use public nuisance law as a tool
for public health offer a concrete context in which to examine how
persuasive the liberal critique might be for courts, and possibly also
251. See Epstein, supra note 11, at S154 (criticizing a hypothetical “fat tax”
because it would “strike all consumers of that product no matter what their
individual health profiles”).
252. See Pope, supra note 9, at 15, 18–19 (discussing how the federal and
state governments have begun to address the harms of tanning beds through
excise taxes and age restrictions).
253. See Epstein, supra note 11, at S154 (postulating that such lawsuits
“could spur individuals to eat fattier foods, if they believe the law will provide
them with a non-waivable warranty against the supplier of the foods in
question”).
254. See Hall, supra note 65, at S200 (commenting on “the tremendous
success the public health community has had in creating a strong social stigma
against cigarette smoking . . . by forcing smokers to huddle in designated spots
outside public spaces and most larger workplaces”).
255. See id. at S205 (“‘Just because . . . poverty . . . interfere[s] with the
health of individuals and populations does not mean that eliminating these
conditions is part of the mission of public health.’” (quoting Rothstein,
Rethinking the Meaning of Public Health, supra note 85, at 144 )). But see Hall,
supra note 65, at S201 (“‘To address comprehensively the problem of health
inequalities, governments must begin to address the issue of our economic
inequalities per se.’” (quoting Norman Daniels et al., Why Justice is Good for
Our Health: The Social Determinants of Health Inequalities, 128 DAEDALUS 215,
241 (1999))).
256. See id. at S202 (stating that classifying “excess weight as a public
health concern rather than simply as a matter of individual health behavior
leads to a whole new way of thinking about . . . regulation of the fast food
industry”).
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for policymakers. Public health advocates would be wise to cull
insights from the public nuisance debate that might be helpful in
the public health battles on the horizon.
If the ecological model of public health intervention is
ultimately going to gain political and legal traction, then advocates
will have to find more powerful ways of justifying it in the face of a
longstanding classical liberal political tradition. 257 They must find
new ways of conveying the impact of public health threats on
communities—as distinct from the sum of the impacts on
individuals within them. The gun violence that David Kairys
described is not merely the aggregation of the effects of guns on
individual friends and family members of those who are killed or
injured. It is different in kind and it is described in ecological terms:
“a climate of fear that undermines our communities and the positive
sense of community.” 258 The communitarian foundations of public
health law and the insights of social epidemiology are unlikely to
lead to revolution. It is not only infeasible, but also inadvisable, to
attempt somehow to surmount the liberal tradition in American
law. But that liberal tradition can and should be supplemented by
the communitarian language of public health. Legal analysis using
a lens that draws on the objectives and methodology of public health
science offers a means for doing so.

257. See, e.g., Wallack & Lawrence, supra note 77, at 568 (discussing how
the values of equality, fairness, and compassion are closely associated with the
modern, broad view of public health, values which are more limited in the
United States than in other Western democracies).
258. Kairys, Origin and Development, supra note 128, at 1165.

